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When Provocation Is No Excuse: 
Making Gun Owners Bear the Risks of 
Carrying in Public 
ERIC A. JOHNSON† 
Markeis McGlockton, an unarmed 28-year-old African-
American father of three, was shot to death in front of his five-
year-old son by “wannabe police officer” Michael Drejka 
during an argument over parking. Because McGlockton had 
shoved Drejka before Drejka shot him, Drejka was convicted 
only of heat-of-passion manslaughter, not murder. This 
Article argues that the heat-of-passion defense shouldn’t be 
available in cases like Drejka’s—cases where the defendant 
was carrying a loaded gun in public at the time of the 
provocation and used the gun to kill his provoker. The heat-
of-passion defense is a concession to the difficulty of 
complying with the law’s demands in moments of passion. In 
cases like Drejka’s, however, the defendant’s difficulty in 
complying with the homicide law is of his own making. If he 
had taken the same precaution that most people take against 
such difficulties—namely, not carrying a loaded gun in 
public—he wouldn’t have had any trouble not killing his 
provoker. 
In defending the proposed limit on the heat-of-passion 
 
†Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful to Ernest 
Johnson for his comments on an earlier version of this paper and to the editors of 
the Buffalo Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance. 
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defense, this Article will advance three novel claims about the 
criminal law: (1) that self-mediated risk—risk that is 
mediated by the actor’s own future volitional conduct—
sometimes suffices to make conduct morally blameworthy; (2) 
that even decisions by an actor that appear to represent core 
exercises of protected individual liberties—the decision to 
form racist beliefs, for example, or the decision to carry a gun 
outside the home—sometimes can supply the locus of moral 
blame in criminal prosecutions; and (3) that in cases where 
the actor’s fault inheres in self-mediated risk, the law’s usual 
reluctance to impute moral blame doesn’t apply. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, laws that prohibit individuals from carrying 
loaded guns outside the home are thought to be 
constitutionally suspect.1 The trouble with these laws is not, 
presumably, that carrying a firearm outside the home 
doesn’t pose risks. It obviously does.2 For one thing, it poses 
a risk that the person carrying the gun will use it unlawfully 
to kill another person “in a sudden heat of passion.”3 The 
trouble with laws that prohibit public carry, rather, is that 
under the Second Amendment the responsibility for 
evaluating these sorts of risks belongs to the individual gun 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down, 
as violative of the Second Amendment, a District of Columbia statute that 
“confine[d] carrying a handgun in public to those with a special need for self-
defense”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down, as 
violative of the Second Amendment, Illinois’s blanket prohibition on public 
carry). 
 2. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937 (“A gun is a potential danger to more people if 
carried in public than just kept in the home.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 116 (Dover 1991) (1881) (commenting on “the danger to the public 
of the growing habit of carrying deadly weapons”). 
 3. State v. Moerman, 895 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)); see also Gould v. 
Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018) (observing that Massachusetts scheme 
regulating public carry “endeavored ‘to prevent the temptation and the ability to 
use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on 
oneself.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
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owner, not the government.4 The individual gun owner is 
responsible for deciding, among other things, whether the 
risk that he will kill someone else in the heat of passion is 
great enough to outweigh the benefits of carrying the gun.5 
That’s the theory, anyway. In practice, when an 
individual gets this decision wrong—when he decides to 
carry a gun and then winds up using the gun to kill someone 
else unlawfully in the heat of passion—he isn’t really held 
responsible for his decision to carry the gun. True, he’ll 
usually be convicted of manslaughter. But this conviction 
will be based exclusively on his conduct in the moment when 
he pulled the trigger—when his self-control was impaired by 
passion. The earlier moment, when he decided—
dispassionately—to carry a loaded gun in public in spite of 
the risk that he would later use it to kill someone unlawfully, 
won’t figure at all. In short: the seriousness of his crime will 
be adjusted downward from murder to manslaughter to 
reflect the difficulty for him, in the moment of the crime, of 
complying with the law. But his crime won’t be adjusted 
upward to reflect the fact that he was responsible for 
creating that very difficulty—for creating a situation where 
he had ready access to a loaded gun while in a state of 
extreme passion. 
Consider the circumstances surrounding the 2018 death 
of Markeis McGlockton. On the afternoon of July 19, 2018, 
McGlockton’s girlfriend, Britany Jacobs, drove McGlockton 
and their three children to a Clearwater, Florida convenience 
store.6 Jacobs parked the car illegally in a handicapped spot, 
 
 4. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 668 (“[T]he law-abiding citizen’s right to bear common 
arms must enable the typical citizen to carry a gun.”). 
 5. Cf. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 41–42, Florida v. Drejka, No. 18-
09851-CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019) (sentencing remarks of Judge Bulone) 
(“Under the law, the people of the State of Florida, at least under certain 
circumstances, have the right to possess and carry firearms. However, with those 
rights come responsibilities.”). 
 6. Id. at 48; see also Julia Jacobs, “Stand Your Ground” Cited by Florida 
Sheriff Who Declined to Arrest Suspect in Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/florida-stand-your-ground.html. 
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then waited in the car with two of her children while 
McGlockton and the third child went into the store to buy 
snacks.7 As Jacobs waited in the car, she was approached by 
Michael Drejka, who confronted her about where she had 
parked.8 Drejka told Jacobs that he had handicapped family 
members, and he instructed her to move her car.9 She told 
him to leave her alone.10 McGlockton was still in the store 
when he overheard someone telling the clerk about the 
confrontation in the parking lot.11 When McGlockton left the 
store and found Drejka yelling at Jacobs, he shoved Drejka, 
causing him to fall over backward.12 Without getting up, 
Drejka removed his .40 caliber handgun from its holster and 
shot McGlockton once in the side.13 As a surveillance video of 
the convenience store parking lot showed, McGlockton was 
backing away when Drejka shot him.14 Paramedics rushed 
McGlockton to a nearby hospital, where he died a few hours 
later.15 
The county sheriff’s office at first refused to arrest or 
charge Drejka, citing Florida’s stand-your-ground law.16 Two 
weeks later, though, prosecutors charged Drejka with 
 
 7. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 48, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 8. Tamara Lush, Newly Released Records Show Lead-Up to Parking Lot 
Shooting, AP NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://apnews.com/406e79bcdef44b428c 
3956d082329981/Newly-released-records-show-lead-up-to-parking-lot-shooting. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 49, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 12. Id. at 50. 
 13. Enjoli Francis, Gunman in Parking Space Shooting Not Charged Because 
of “Stand Your Ground” Law, ABC NEWS (July 20, 2018, 5:34 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/gunman-parking-space-shooting-charged-stand-
ground-law/story?id=56715356. 
 14. Id.; Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 50–51, State v. Drejka, No. 18-
09851-CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 15. Jacobs, supra note 6. 
 16. Id. 
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manslaughter.17 In part because McGlockton and Jacobs 
were African-American and Drejka was white, the case 
attracted substantial attention in the national media. 
Among the questions posed by the national media was why 
Drejka hadn’t been charged with murder.18 The answer, 
basically, was that he was thought to have been acting in the 
heat of passion when he killed McGlockton. 
Florida’s homicide statutes are somewhat idiosyncratic, 
but their treatment of intentional homicides roughly tracks 
the treatment of intentional homicides in other jurisdictions. 
An intentional killing will count as first-degree murder if it 
was premeditated—if enough time passed between the 
formation of the intent to kill and the killing itself to “allow 
reflection by the defendant.”19 If an intentional killing wasn’t 
premeditated but still was “done from ill will, hatred, spite, 
or an evil intent,” it will be treated as second-degree 
murder.20 Finally, if an intentional killing was committed “in 
the heat of passion based on adequate provocation,” the 
killing will qualify as manslaughter.21 Drejka was charged 
 
 17. Lush, supra note 8. 
 18. Erik Ortiz, Michael Drejka Charged in Florida “Stand Your Ground” 
Killing. But Why Wasn’t It Murder?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/michael-drejka-charged-florida-stand-
your-ground-killing-why-wasn-n900406. 
 19. FLA. STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.2 (FLA. SUP. CT. STANDARD 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMS. 2018). 
 20. Bellamy v. State, 977 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“An act is 
one ‘imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind’ if it is an 
act or series of acts that: (1) a person of ordinary judgment would know is 
reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and (2) is done 
from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil intent, and (3) is of such a nature that the 
act itself indicates an indifference to human life.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 
782.04(2) (2019) (defining second-degree murder as “[t]he unlawful killing of a 
human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and 
evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any 
premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual”). 
 21. FLA. STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.4 (FLA. SUP. CT. STANDARD 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMS. 2018) (requiring jury to acquit the defendant of 
second-degree murder if he or she “acted in the heat of passion based on adequate 
provocation”). 
948 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
with manslaughter because Florida courts consistently have 
said that any killing as impulsive as Drejka’s—any killing 
that originates in “[a]n impulsive overreaction to an attack 
or injury”—is insufficient as a matter of law to count as 
second-degree murder.22 
In short, the reason Drejka avoided prosecution for 
murder was that he was able to avail himself of the partial 
defense of “heat of passion.” The basic idea behind this 
defense, as every first-year law student learns, is that the 
defendant’s extreme emotional state in the moments after a 
“sudden provocation,” though it doesn’t rob him entirely of 
his ability to control his actions, does impair his ability to 
control his actions.23 This impairment, in turn, partly 
excuses his conduct.24 In Drejka’s case, the “sudden 
provocation” took the form, as it often does, of an attack or 
injury inflicted by the homicide victim.25 It’s plausible to 
suppose, as Florida prosecutors evidently did, that this 
sudden provocation—being shoved to the ground by the 
larger, stronger McGlockton—left Drejka in a state of 
passion, which impaired his ability to control himself in the 
moment that he pulled the trigger.26 So far, so good. 
The trouble with this analysis is that pulling the trigger 
wasn’t the only thing, or even the worst thing,27 Drejka did 
 
 22. Sandhaus v. State, 200 So. 3d 112, 114–15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 23. See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections 
on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 974 (2002) (“The modern defense is 
. . . about the excusable loss of self-control.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See People v. Curwick, 338 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) 
(“Provocation is usually restricted to physical assaults, mutual quarrel or combat, 
adultery and similar situations.”). 
 26. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 54, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019) (“The defendant was blindsided. He was pushed down 
rather violently. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that.”). 
 27. See Daniel Peabody, Target Discrimination: Protecting the Second 
Amendment Rights of Women and Minorities, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 883, 891 (2016) 
(“The Richmond Grand Jury provided: ‘We consider the practice of carrying arms 
secreted, in cases where no personal attack can reasonably be apprehended, to be 
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that day to cause McGlockton’s death. Drejka also caused 
McGlockton’s death by arming himself with a loaded .40 
caliber Glock handgun when he left home on the day of 
McGlockton’s death. If Drejka hadn’t armed himself that 
day, it’s extremely unlikely McGlockton would’ve ended up 
dead.28 McGlockton appears to have been the stronger of the 
two men, which is why Drejka wound up on the ground in 
the wake of the initial confrontation.29 Even if he hadn’t 
been, moreover, it seems likely that bystanders would have 
intervened if Drejka had tried, say, to beat or strangle 
McGlockton to death. Drejka’s decision to arm himself 
appears to have been a cause-in-fact of McGlockton’s death, 
then.30 Drejka’s decision to arm himself also was a proximate 
cause of McGlockton’s death. It was very far from 
“unforeseeable” that Drejka, by arming himself with a loaded 
gun, would cause someone’s death unlawfully. The world is 
full of provocations, as everybody knows. 
Drejka’s decision to carry a gun that day wasn’t just a 
cause of McGlockton’s death, moreover. It also was culpable. 
As it happens, Drejka had particular reason to know that his 
decision to carry a gun posed an unjustified risk to others. 
He had on other occasions responded to perceived slights by 
threatening to shoot other people.31 He also had confronted 
 
infinitely more reprehensible than even the act of stabbing, if committed during 
a sudden affray, in the heat of passion, where the party was not previously armed 
for the purpose.’”). 
 28. But see Nicholas Moeller, The Second Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: 
Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (2014) (attributing 
to opponents of stricter concealed carry laws the argument that “the spontaneous 
murders using a firearm might have been committed with another implement in 
the absence of a weapon”). 
 29. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 54, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 30. See Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(explaining that Florida criminal law generally requires the government to prove, 
by way of cause-in-fact, that the “result would not have occurred ‘but for’ the 
defendant’s conduct”). 
 31. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 43–45, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-
CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019); Lush, supra note 8. 
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others about parking in handicapped spots on prior 
occasions.32 (These confrontations were the reason why the 
trial judge, in his sentencing remarks, repeatedly described 
Drejka as a “wannabe police officer.”33) Moreover, Drejka 
was aware, as he acknowledged to the police, that these 
confrontations had the potential to “go sideways.”34 His 
decision to arm himself, knowing that he might misuse the 
gun, made his eventual misuse of the gun to kill McGlockton 
entirely foreseeable.35 And his conscious awareness of this 
risk made his decision to arm himself at least reckless.36 In 
theory, then, given the culpability of Drejka’s decision to arm 
himself, and given the causal relationship between this 
culpable choice and McGlockton’s death, Drejka’s decision to 
arm himself that day amounted to a separate, stand-alone 
basis for convicting him of reckless homicide.37 
Of course, it wouldn’t really make sense to convict Drejka 
of two separate forms of homicide for causing a single 
person’s death. Courts have long held that the law generally 
precludes the imposition of “multiple convictions and 
sentences for variations of murder [or manslaughter] when 
only one person was killed.”38 Some courts have treated this 
 
 32. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 43–45, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-
CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 33. Id. at 43, 49. 
 34. Id. at 47. 
 35. See id. at 46 (recounting prior incident at same convenience store where 
Drejka shot McGlockton, after which Drejka acknowledged both (1) “If I had a 
gun, I would have shot him,” referring to the person he had confronted; and (2) “I 
cannot help it. I get myself in trouble.”). 
 36. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (defining 
“recklessly” to require “conscious[] disregard[]” of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk). 
 37. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 35 (1993) (“[I]f, from the big bang 
that apparently began this show to the heat death of the universe that will end 
it, the court can find a voluntary act by the defendant, accompanied at that time 
by whatever culpable mens rea that is required, which act in fact and proximately 
causes some legally prohibited state of affairs, then the defendant is prima facie 
liable for that legal harm.”). 
 38. Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[A] decisive 
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prohibition as rooted in double jeopardy.39 Others have 
treated the prohibition as rooted simply in legislative 
intent.40 Whether rooted in double jeopardy or just in 
legislative intent, though, the view that a defendant may be 
convicted only of a single count of homicide for killing a single 
victim enjoys nearly universal support.41 As one Maryland 
court nicely put it: “In homicide cases, the units of 
prosecution are dead bodies, not theories of aggravation.”42 
One possible alternative to the imposition of separate 
convictions for homicide would be to punish defendants like 
Drejka for a separate non-homicide offense that reflects the 
culpability associated with the decision to carry or use a 
firearm. Several state legislatures, including Florida’s,43 
have adopted statutes that impose additional punishment—
either in the form of a separate conviction or in the form of a 
sentence enhancement—where a defendant uses a firearm in 
 
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that a trial court 
cannot impose multiple convictions and sentences for variations of murder when 
only one person was killed.”); but see Johnson v. State, 709 A.2d 1158, 1159 (Del. 
1998) (“This Court has previously interpreted 11 Del. C. § 636(a) as permitting 
the imposition of multiple punishments for separate convictions of felony murder 
and intentional murder, based on the same death.”). 
 39. Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 809 (“Many of these jurisdictions have expressly 
characterized punishment for two or more murder variations for a single death 
as a double jeopardy violation.”). 
 40. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.4(b) (4th ed. 
2015) (explaining that the Supreme Court appears to have concluded that double 
jeopardy protection where multiple punishments (rather than multiple 
prosecutions) are at issue can be made contingent on legislative intent). 
 41. Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 807. 
 42. Burroughs v. State, 594 A.2d 625, 633 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 43. See Lewis v. State, 952 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Here, 
it is undisputed that Mr. Lewis used a firearm when committing a felony. 
Therefore, the trial court properly reclassified his charge of manslaughter, a level 
7, second-degree felony to a level 8, first-degree felony.”). 
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the commission of a violent felony.44 So has Congress.45 But 
statutes like these generally are designed to reflect the 
enhanced “risk of harm resulting from the manner in which 
the crime is carried out,” as the Supreme Court has said.46 
They’re designed, that is, to reflect the inchoate risk 
associated with the defendant’s use of a gun in connection 
with the felony.47 They’re not designed to reflect the 
defendant’s culpability in relation to the risk that came to 
fruition in the victim’s death. And, accordingly, they don’t 
require any causal connection between the use of the firearm 
and the occurrence of harm. 
There’s a better approach to cases like Drejka’s, as I’ll 
argue in this Article. Where an individual decides to carry a 
loaded firearm in public and then, after being provoked, uses 
the firearm to kill another person unlawfully in the heat of 
passion, he should be denied the benefit of the heat-of-
passion defense. He should be convicted of murder, in other 
words, not manslaughter. This approach takes seriously the 
idea that, in the post-Heller world,48 individuals are 
 
 44. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(c) (West 2019) (“Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, any person who, in the commission of a felony specified 
in subdivision (a), personally and intentionally discharges a firearm, shall be 
punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state 
prison for 20 years.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-55a (West 2007) (“A person is 
guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when he commits 
manslaughter in the first degree as provided in section 53a-55, and in the 
commission of such offense he uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of or 
displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, machine gun, rifle or other firearm.”). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (specifying mandatory sentence enhancements for 
defendants, who in the course of a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime, 
carry, brandish, or discharge a firearm). 
 46. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 576 (2009). 
 47. See id. But cf. United States v. Cuff, 38 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (arguing that use of a firearm shouldn’t aggravate a homicide offense: “[I]f 
the crime is a homicide to start with, likely success and loss of life are moot; to 
the extent that use of a firearm might endanger additional lives, the factor of 
grave risk of death to additional persons is covered by statute.”). 
 48. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects the right of an individual to keep and bear arms). 
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responsible for deciding for themselves whether the benefits 
of carrying a firearm outweigh the risk that they’ll kill 
someone in the heat of passion. If the defendant decides 
dispassionately to carry a loaded firearm in public and later 
uses the gun to kill someone else in the heat of passion, the 
law is justified in ascribing fault not just to the killing itself 
but to the defendant’s earlier decision to arm himself. This 
fault in the earlier moment is more than sufficient to offset 
the mitigating effects of the defendant’s impaired self-control 
in the moment of the killing. Cumulatively, then, the 
defendant’s fault in arming himself and his fault in killing 
the victim justify liability for murder. 
This cumulation of the defendant’s fault in arming 
himself and his fault in killing the victim might, at first 
glance, seem arbitrary and improvised. It isn’t. The 
defendant’s fault in arming himself directly undercuts the 
rationale for the heat-of-passion defense. The idea behind the 
heat-of-passion defense is, roughly, that the passion’s 
impairment of the defendant’s self-control made it difficult 
for him to comply with the law’s commands in the moment 
when he pulled the trigger.49 In cases like Drejka’s, though, 
the difficulty faced by the impassioned defendant isn’t 
attributable just to his anger. It also is attributable in part 
to the ready availability of a loaded firearm. If Drejka hadn’t 
had a gun when McGlockton shoved him, he wouldn’t have 
found it difficult at all to comply with the homicide statute’s 
commands. Indeed, he probably would have found it difficult, 
if not impossible, not to comply with the homicide laws. 
Denying defendants like Drejka the benefit of the heat-of-
passion defense makes perfect sense, then, since they’re 
responsible—by virtue of their decision to arm themselves—
for the very difficulty that supposedly excuses their 
subsequent conduct. 
In the first four Parts of this Article, I’ll lay out the basic 
 
 49. Sarah Sorial, Anger, Provocation and Loss of Self-Control: What Does 
“Losing It” Really Mean?, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 247, 247 (2018). 
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argument for the proposed limit on the heat-of-passion 
defense. My strategy in these Parts will be to argue that the 
problem posed by cases like Drejka’s is really just one facet 
of a much broader problem, which I’ll refer to as the criminal 
law’s moral-hazard problem. The phrase “moral hazard” 
originally was used to refer to the danger than an insured, 
after purchasing insurance, would have less incentive than 
before to take precautions against the insured losses.50 
Nowadays the term is used more broadly to refer, as Paul 
Krugman has said, to “any situation in which one person 
makes the decision about how much risk to take, while 
someone else bears the cost if things go badly.”51 This broader 
sense captures the problem posed by Drejka’s decision to 
carry a gun, as I’ll argue in Part I. In Parts II and III, I’ll 
explore the criminal law’s general strategy for resolving its 
moral-hazard problem. In Part IV, I’ll argue that my 
proposed limit on the heat-of-passion defense is in keeping 
with this general strategy. 
After laying out the basic argument in Parts I through 
IV, I’ll then explain how this argument, despite its seeming 
inevitability, departs dramatically from the presuppositions 
of orthodox criminal law theory. First, in Part V, I’ll explain 
why self-mediated risk—risk that is mediated by the actor’s 
own future volitional acts—really can make the actor’s 
present conduct morally wrongful, contrary to what the 
theorists appear to have assumed. In Part VI, I’ll explain 
why even choices that appear to represent core exercises of 
individual liberties—like the individual’s decision to carry a 
gun outside the home—nevertheless can, after they come to 
fruition in conduct harmful to others, provide the loci of 
 
 50. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 48 (6th ed. 
2012) (“Moral hazard arises when the behavior of the insured person or entity 
changes after the purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or the size 
of the loss increases.”); see also Hazard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(identifying the term “moral hazard” as belonging to the subject of insurance and 
as having originated around 1881). 
 51. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS 
OF 2008, at 63 (2009). 
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blame in criminal prosecutions. Finally, in Part VII, I’ll 
explain why, in cases where the locus of fault is temporally 
removed from the conduct that triggers the imposition of 
liability, imputed fault is the norm, rather than a disfavored 
departure from the norm. 
I. THE CRIMINAL LAW’S MORAL-HAZARD PROBLEM 
Herbert Morris nicely described the criminal law as a 
“system . . . in which the rules establish a mutuality of 
benefit and burden.”52 Community members derive benefits 
from the criminal law in the form of “noninterference by 
others with what each person values, such matters as 
continuance of life and bodily security.”53 What makes these 
benefits possible, though, is the assumption by community 
members of a mutual burden, namely, the burden of 
“exercis[ing] self-restraint . . . over inclinations that would, 
if satisfied, directly interfere or create a substantial risk of 
interference with others in proscribed ways.”54 Individuals 
differ, of course, in how they go about satisfying this 
burden.55 Some cultivate virtuous dispositions, so as to 
moderate those “inclinations” that would, if satisfied, 
interfere with other people’s safety or security.56 Others rely 
instead on their powers of self-control.57 Still others avoid 
 
 52. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477 (1968). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an 
Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 168 (2003) (“[S]o long as 
we do not commit what the law defines as crimes, the law has no interest in why 
we do not commit them—in whether our non-criminal conduct expresses virtue, 
self-control, a self-interested concern to avoid sanctions, or whatever.”). 
 56. See id. at 163 (explaining that the virtuous individual “does not have to 
resist temptation, or overcome contrary feeling or inclination, in order to act as 
she sees she should, since there is nothing in her character that would motivate 
her against what is appropriate”). 
 57. Id. at 164; see also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 32–33 (1979) (“A 
person may be greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or 
conceited, but behave perfectly by a monumental effort of will.”). 
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situations where they might be tempted to act on antisocial 
inclinations.58 By whatever means they go about satisfying 
the burden imposed by the criminal law, though, the burden 
is the same for everyone, at least in theory. The criminal law 
is, as Holmes said, “of general application.”59 It requires each 
of us to “come up to a certain height.”60 
When an individual fails to come up to that certain 
height—when he “renounces a burden that others have 
voluntarily assumed,” in Morris’s words—he is subject to 
punishment.61 Different sorts of crimes justify different 
degrees of punishment, of course. But even where the same 
statutory proscription is concerned, not every violation 
justifies the same degree of punishment. One reason for 
these variations in punishment is that sometimes 
individuals find themselves in situations where complying 
with the criminal law’s demands isn’t possible, or at least is 
much more difficult than it usually would be.62 An individual 
who violates the proscription on criminal trespass, for 
example, might do so only because the alternative is freezing 
to death in a blizzard.63 Or he might trespass only because 
someone has threatened to injure him physically if he 
doesn’t.64 Or he might trespass because a mental disease or 
defect has left him unable to understand that the property 
 
 58. See REPO MAN (Edge City Prods. 1984) (“An ordinary person spends his 
life avoiding tense situations. A repo man spends his life getting into tense 
situations.”). 
 59. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 50. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Morris, supra note 52, at 477. 
 62. See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 183 (1992) 
(observing that excusing conditions reflect “the existence of empirical conditions 
making conformity with the law exceptionally difficult”). 
 63. See State v. Zuidema, 552 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (addressing 
defendant’s claim that she was justified in breaking into a stranger’s unoccupied 
home because “she was facing the risk of imminent injury due to hypothermia”). 
 64. See State v. Peters, 737 P.2d 693, 694 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (addressing 
defendant’s claim that his companion “told him to break into Ryder’s house and 
steal some things for him or [the companion] would kill him”). 
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doesn’t belong to him.65 Circumstances like these affect the 
degree of punishment that’s justified, and sometimes even 
absolve the individual of moral blame entirely. That’s why 
the criminal law requires not just conduct that’s violative of 
the law’s external standards but a “guilty mind” as well.66 
It’s also why the criminal law recognizes a variety of 
defenses—necessity, duress, insanity, heat of passion, etc.67 
Because the criminal law differentiates offenders on the 
basis of circumstances like these, however, a kind of moral-
hazard problem arises.68 The trouble, basically, is that 
circumstances that make compliance with the criminal law 
more difficult sometimes are of the offender’s own making. 
The person who faces the choice between freezing to death in 
a blizzard and breaking into someone else’s vacant cabin 
might face that choice only because she decided stupidly to 
go four-wheeling in a blizzard. The person who is threatened 
with violence if he doesn’t trespass might face that threat 
only because he joined a gang that regularly coerces its 
members to commit crimes. The person whose mental 
disease leaves him unable to understand that a cabin doesn’t 
belong to him might be afflicted by that mental disease only 
because he chose, sadly, to abuse illegal drugs over an 
extended period. 
If the criminal law routinely permitted offenders to 
invoke circumstances of their own creation as a basis for 
mitigation, then the whole idea of requiring everyone to 
 
 65. See People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Cal. 1978) (addressing 
defendant’s claim that “as a result of mental illness he lacked the specific intent 
required for [burglary]”). 
 66. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (“Although there are 
exceptions, the ‘general rule’ is that a guilty mind is ‘a necessary element in the 
indictment and proof of every crime.’”). 
 67. See HORDER, supra note 62, at 183 (describing how empirical conditions 
associated with typical excuse defenses make “conformity with the law 
exceptionally difficult”). 
 68. See KRUGMAN, supra note 51, at 63 (defining moral hazard as “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, 
while someone else bears the cost if things go badly”). 
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“come up to a certain height” would break down, as would 
the idea of permitting individuals to decide for themselves 
how to satisfy the criminal law’s demands. When we say that 
individuals “decide for themselves” how to bring their 
conduct up to a certain height, we mean in part that 
individuals get to choose between (1) bearing the costs of 
compliance earlier—by, say, cultivating habits of concern for 
other people, or (2) bearing the costs of compliance later—by, 
say, exercising exceptional self-control.69 If the law simply 
were to judge the offender on the basis of the difficulty for 
him of complying with the law’s demands in the moment of 
the offense, without regard to the offender’s responsibility for 
bringing about the circumstances that make compliance 
more difficult, then the offender’s choices in the earlier 
moments wouldn’t just be choices about how to comply with 
the law’s demands. Rather, those earlier choices would 
determine what the law demands of the individual. The law 
would end up demanding less of some individuals than of 
others. 
Take the individual who, as a result of her earlier 
decision to go four-wheeling in a blizzard, later faced a choice 
between freezing to death and breaking into a vacant cabin. 
Trish, let’s call her.70 Is Trish guilty of criminal trespass? It’s 
hard to quarrel with the conclusion that her trespass is 
justified by necessity.71 At the same time, though, if we allow 
her to invoke the necessity defense in spite of her 
 
 69. See Duff, supra note 55, at 163–64 (observing that individual can avoid 
committing crimes either by cultivating a virtuous disposition or by exercising 
exceptional self-control); HORDER, supra note 62, at 128 (explaining that it “is not 
a matter of concern to the criminal law” whether people manage to avoid 
committing crimes by cultivating virtuous dispositions or instead manage to 
avoid committing crimes by exercising self-restraint). 
 70. The “Trish” hypothetical is developed and explored in Eric A. Johnson, 
Self-Mediated Risk in Criminal Law, 35 L. & PHIL. 537, 547–49 (2016). See also 
LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, REFLECTIONS ON CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES 39–40 (2018) (discussing Trish problem); 
Larry Alexander, Culpably Creating the Conditions of Justified Acts: Another 
Look, 49 PHILOSOPHIA 107, 107–09 (2020), (discussing Trish problem). 
 71. Johnson, supra note 70, at 547. 
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carelessness in going four-wheeling in a blizzard, aren’t we 
demanding less of her, on balance, than we demand of 
others? Suppose another individual from Trish’s town, Todd 
we’ll call him, also thought about going four-wheeling on the 
day of the blizzard, but ultimately decided not to, for the sake 
avoiding just the sort of necessitous situation that eventually 
confronted Trish. Todd, in other words, took account of the 
risk that going four-wheeling would cause him to commit a 
trespass, and decided that this risk outweighed the benefits 
to him. By contrast, Trish decided to accept that risk. If Trish 
isn’t punished—if she succeeds in forcing the cabin’s owner 
to bear the risk she created—is it really accurate to say that 
law made the same demands of Trish and Todd? 
Choices that make the individual’s later compliance with 
the law more difficult aren’t always, or usually, as concrete 
and easily analyzed as Trish’s decision to go four-wheeling in 
a blizzard. Most of the difficulties we create for ourselves we 
create gradually over time by “habitually fashioning our 
characters in the wrong way,” as William James said.72 
Aristotle likewise identified bad character, or bad habits, as 
the source of most blameworthy conduct.73 “It makes no 
small difference,” he said, “whether we form habits of one 
kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great 
difference, or rather all the difference.”74 As Aristotle and 
James both would have acknowledged, habits that make 
compliance with the criminal law more difficult include not 
just habitual patterns of behavior but habitual ways of 
thinking as well.75 Habitual “insensitivity to the interests of 
 
 72. WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 83 (1890) (Encyclopedia 
Britannica ed. 1952) (“The hell to be ensured hereafter, of which theology tells, is 
no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually 
fashioning our characters in the wrong way.”). 
 73. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I, ch. 1 (W.D. Ross transl. 1958) (c. 
350 B.C.E.). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Duff, supra note 55, at 163 (recounting Aristotle’s view that “true virtue 
also involves appropriate dispositions of thought, of attention, of observation”); 
WILLIAM JAMES, PSYCHOLOGY: THE BRIEFER COURSE 172 (1892) (“What is called 
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other people,” for example, makes compliance with the 
criminal law more difficult, in part by causing the individual 
to fail to advert to the risks posed by his conduct.76 As Alec 
Walen has said, criminal conduct less often is the result of 
contemporaneous moral fault than of “a series of earlier 
choices . . . not to cultivate a responsible concern for 
others.”77 
The kinds of difficulties we make for ourselves by 
“fashioning our characters the wrong way” often provide 
colorable legal bases for mitigation or even outright 
absolution. Suppose, for example, that an individual who has 
cultivated an insensitivity to the interests of others fails, as 
a consequence of this insensitivity, to advert to the risk of 
death posed by his conduct to others.78 This failure to advert, 
because it makes compliance with the law more difficult,79 
 
our ‘experience’ is almost entirely determined by our habits of attention.”). 
 76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (explaining that 
“moral defect can properly be imputed [in cases of criminal negligence] to 
instances where the defendant acts out of insensitivity to the interests of other 
people, and not merely out of an intellectual failure to grasp them”). 
 77. Alec Walen, Crime, Culpability and Moral Luck, 29 L. & PHIL. 373, 383 
(2010); see also Paul J. Heald, Mindlessness and Nondurable Precautions, 27 GA. 
L. REV. 673, 677 (1993) (summarizing recent psychological research, which shows 
that “much of our behavior is mindless in the sense that we respond [to previously 
encountered stimuli] without consciously making a decision.”); Dan M. Kahan & 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 269, 358 (1996) (defending evaluative conception of emotion, under which 
“a person is responsible not only for making good choices but for having good 
character”). 
 78. H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136, 146 
(1968) (“[I]f anything is blameworthy [about negligence] it is not the ‘state of 
mind’ but the agent’s failure to inform himself of the facts and so getting into this 
‘state of mind.’”). 
 79. It would be wrong to suppose that the individual’s failure to advert to the 
risk makes compliance with the law not just more difficult but impossible. The 
law imposes liability for criminal negligence only when the risk posed by the 
defendant’s conduct was substantial and unjustifiable under “the circumstances 
known to him.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (AM. L. INST. 1985); see also 
HOLMES, supra note 2, at 75. So it imposes liability only in cases where the 
defendant, in “the moment of choosing,” has at least the raw capacity to foresee 
the risk posed by his conduct. See id. at 54 (“But the choice must be made with a 
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will shield him from liability for both depraved-heart murder 
and reckless homicide, which require the government to 
prove that the defendant was consciously aware of the risk 
to others when he acted.80 Likewise, a defendant who 
cultivates a violent, jealous temperament, or a powerful 
hatred of others, might as a consequence find himself in a 
state of extreme anger or passion. This extreme emotional 
state will, naturally, make compliance with the criminal law 
more difficult. The heat-of-passion defense makes 
allowances, in some circumstances, for people who face just 
this difficulty—who, by virtue of their extreme anger, find it 
difficult not to kill the person who has provoked them.81 
In short, the criminal law frequently has to decide what 
to do with defendants who: (1) find compliance with the 
criminal law unusually difficult for reasons either external 
(blizzards, threats, etc.) or internal (passion, unawareness of 
risk to others, etc.); but (2) are themselves responsible for the 
very circumstances that make compliance with the criminal 
law more difficult. It’s probably obvious why this class of 
cases is of interest to us here. Drejka’s heat-of-passion 
defense to murder was, in effect, a claim that his anger at 
McGlockton made it difficult for him to comply with the law’s 
proscription on intentional homicide. At the same time, the 
difficulty Drejka faced was of his own making. If Drejka 
hadn’t been armed, complying with the law wouldn’t have 
been difficult at all. It would’ve been easy, since Drejka 
probably lacked the physical wherewithal to kill the 
McGlockton with his bare hands. Lots of people refrain from 
carrying guns for just this reason, in fact. Instead of 
cultivating virtuous dispositions or exceptional self-control, 
 
chance of contemplating the consequence complained of, or else it has no bearing 
on responsibility for consequence.”). 
 80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (defining “recklessly” 
to require conscious disregard of the risk); People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 741 
(Cal. 2007) (holding that the “subjective component” of depraved-heart murder 
requires subjective awareness of a “risk of death”). 
 81. Dressler, supra note 23, at 972. 
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and instead of avoiding tense situations, they comply with 
the homicide law’s demands simply by not carrying guns. 
Bear in mind: Drejka’s isn’t a case where the defendant 
“caused the conditions of his [own] defense,” in Paul 
Robinson’s formulation.82 The elements of Drejka’s heat-of-
passion defense were just that he had acted in a “blind and 
unreasoning fury” as the result of a “a sudden event that 
would have suspended the exercise of judgment in an 
ordinary reasonable person.”83 Nobody would argue, 
presumably, that Drejka’s possession of a firearm caused the 
“sudden event” that provoked him into killing McGlockton—
the shove by McGlockton. Nor would they argue that 
Drejka’s possession of the firearm caused his “blind and 
unreasoning fury.” In the narrow, Robinsonian sense, then, 
Drejka didn’t cause the conditions of his defense. 
Still, Drejka’s case shares the features that make the 
“causing conditions” cases problematic for criminal law: a 
defense that hinges on the difficulty for the defendant of 
complying with the criminal law’s demands under the 
circumstances in which he found himself; and a decision by 
the defendant that contributed to the very difficulty he 
asserts as the basis for his defense. If Drejka only had taken 
the same precaution that most other individuals take—
leaving his gun at home—he never would have faced the 
difficulty that he later invoked as the basis for reducing his 
conviction from murder to manslaughter. Like the causing-
conditions cases, then, Drejka’s case requires the law to 
resolve the tension between (1) the law’s concern for taking 
into account variations in degrees of culpability, and its 
concomitant concern for taking account of circumstances 
that make the defendant’s compliance with the law’s 
demands more difficult; and (2) the law’s concern for 
 
 82. See Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A 
Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 25 
(1985). 
 83. FLA. STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.4 (FLA. SUP. CT. STANDARD 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMS. 2018). 
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applying the same standard to everyone, and its concomitant 
concern for denying defenses to defendants who, like Drejka, 
make compliance with the criminal law more difficult for 
themselves. 
II. HOW CRIMINAL LAW ADDRESSES THE  
MORAL-HAZARD PROBLEM 
In resolving the tension between these two competing 
demands, the criminal law naturally is constrained, as it 
always is, by the fact that criminal judgments express moral 
condemnation of the offender.84 Our problem, then, has a 
different complexion than it would have if it arose in, say, the 
law of contracts. 
As it happens, a similar problem does arise in the law of 
contracts.85 Parties to contracts sometimes find themselves 
in situations where discharging their obligations under the 
contract would prove unexpectedly difficult or even 
impossible. Courts traditionally have been inclined to treat 
this sort of “impossibility” or “impracticability” as a defense 
to an action for breach,86 particularly in cases where holding 
the promisor liable for expectation damages would lead to 
inefficient behavior.87 Recognizing a defense of impossibility 
or impracticality creates difficulties of its own, however.88 
 
 84. See Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 401, 402–06 (1958) (explaining centrality of community condemnation to 
our conception of criminal law). 
 85. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 86. See id. (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence 
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to 
render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary.”); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 350 (“In some 
circumstances . . . physical impossibility of performance excuses non-
performance.”). 
 87. Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 311 (1982); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 351. 
 88. Gerhard Wagner, In Defense of the Impossibility Doctrine, 27 LOYOLA U. 
CHI. L.J. 55, 78 (1995) (“A drawback to any exceptions to the expectation damages 
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Sometimes the circumstances that make the promisor’s 
performance difficult or impossible are attributable, directly 
or indirectly, to earlier choices by promisor himself. If the 
promisor can invoke circumstances that were within his 
control as a basis for a reduction in damages, then he will 
have little incentive to take cost-efficient precautions against 
the advent of those circumstances.89 
In addressing this contract-law counterpart to our 
moral-hazard problem, the courts naturally aren’t 
constrained by concerns about the parties’ moral 
blameworthiness.90 They can, if they want, make the 
availability of the impossibility defense depend on something 
like the promisor’s moral probity—on whether the promisor 
can show that he hadn’t brought the difficulties on himself 
by “tak[ing] inadequate precautions to ensure 
performance.”91 But the courts might equally decide to do 
away with the impossibility defense entirely, on the theory 
that “hold[ing] the promisor liable for expectation damages 
[will] encourage the promisor to take efficient precautions 
against obstacles to performance.”92 
In criminal law, by contrast, legislatures couldn’t really 
decide, for the sake of encouraging individuals to “take 
efficient precautions” against future obstacles to compliance 
with the criminal law’s demands, just to foreclose entirely 
the consideration of circumstances that, in the moment of the 
criminal act, make compliance with the criminal law’s 
 
rule, under economic analysis, is that any reduction in damages tends to yield 
inefficient outcomes because it raises the problem of moral hazards.”). 
 89. See id. at 78–79 (“If, by raising a defense, the promisor can avoid liability, 
externalities result, and the promisor’s incentives to take cost-efficient 
precautions weaken.”). 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. ch. 11, introductory note (AM. L. 
INST. 1981) (“Contract liability is strict liability.”). 
 91. Bruce, supra note 87, at 322; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. 
§ 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (limiting impossibility to cases where the “party’s 
performance is made impracticable without his fault”). 
 92. Wagner, supra note 88, at 78. 
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external demands difficult or impossible.93 Disregarding the 
kinds of circumstances that sometimes make compliance 
with the criminal law difficult or impossible—insanity, 
necessity, duress, unawareness of risk—would mean 
dispensing with the requirement of moral blameworthiness. 
Moral blameworthiness is central to criminal law, even for 
those who believe, as Holmes did, that “[t]he purpose of the 
criminal law is to induce external conformity to rule.”94 After 
all, probably the most important of the various ways in which 
the criminal law “induce[s] external conformity to rule” is by 
expressing judgments of moral blameworthiness.95 This 
“moral rhetoric of the criminal law” obviously would be 
undercut if law were to impose punishment in cases where, 
as a result of circumstances outside the actor’s control, 
compliance with the criminal law was impossible or nearly 
impossible.96 
In the end, only one strategy for addressing the moral-
hazard problem really is consistent with the criminal law’s 
 
 93. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 266 (1998) 
(“Punishment is . . . an expression of legal blame. Insofar as this is so, it will seem 
inappropriate, and thus to condemn, someone whose conduct is admitted to be 
blameless . . . .”). 
 94. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 49. 
 95. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 cmt. 3 (AM L. INST. 1985) (acknowledging 
that penal sanctions are designed in part to “advance preventative ends . . . by 
fortifying normal instincts to refrain from injurious behavior”); Johs Andenaes, 
General Prevention—Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 176, 180 (1952) (arguing that penal sanctions are designed in part to 
“strengthen moral inhibitions” and to “stimulate habitual law-abiding conduct” 
and that “[t]o the lawmaker, the achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater 
value than mere deterrence”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean 
“Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American 
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225 (1991) (“In effect [criminal statutes] shape the 
citizens’ unconscious perceptions of the opportunities before them so that 
occasions for unlawful, but profitable, behavior that would be apparent to the 
amoral citizen are never truly apprehended by the law-abiding citizen.”). 
 96. Coffee, supra note 95, at 194; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 
(AM. L. INST. 1985) (“Law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed . . . it is 
hypocritical, if it imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a 
dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm that they 
should and could comply with if their turn to face the problem should arise.”). 
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requirement of moral blameworthiness, namely, identifying 
a substitute or supplemental locus of blame.97 In the cases 
that concern us, the moment of the crime itself won’t suffice 
as a locus of blame, since the defendant’s conduct in that 
moment was excused or justified (or partly excused, in the 
heat-of-passion cases) by circumstances that made 
compliance with the law impossible or at least very difficult. 
If we decide to punish the defendant for his crime anyway, it 
can only be because we’re justified in ascribing or imputing 
fault to the defendant on the basis of what happened in some 
earlier moment,98 when he failed to take adequate 
“precautions against obstacles to performance.”99 This 
substitute or supplemental locus of blame must, moreover—
if it’s to justify conviction for the very offense whose later 
commission ostensibly was justified or excused—bear the 
right kind of causal connection to his commission of this 
offense. 
This strategy—of identifying a substitute or 
supplemental locus of blame—pervades the criminal law. 
The strategy is easiest to spot in causing-conditions cases, 
like the case where Trish went four-wheeling in a blizzard, 
then wound up breaking into another person’s cabin to keep 
warm.100 Under the law of necessity, Trish’s conviction for 
criminal trespass would hinge on whether she was at “fault” 
in bringing about the necessitous situation in which she 
eventually found herself.101 In most jurisdictions, her fault in 
this earlier moment, once proved, would trigger a forfeiture 
 
 97. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 31 (arguing that the actor’s liability in the 
“causing conditions” cases must be “based on his initial conduct in causing the 
defense conditions with the accompanying [mental state], not on the justified or 
excused conduct that he subsequently performs”). 
 98. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 623 
(1984) (explaining how a hidden element of imputed fault “may explain the use 
of an otherwise unjustifiable form of liability”). 
 99. Wagner, supra note 88, at 78. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. 
 101. Johnson, supra note 70, at 548. 
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of the necessity defense, which would leave her exposed to 
conviction for criminal trespass on the basis of her 
subsequent, admittedly justified conduct.102 In a few other 
jurisdictions—namely, the six or so states that have adopted 
the Model Penal Code’s alternative approach103—the jury 
actually would decide whether Trish’s fault in this earlier 
moment sufficed to satisfy the mental state requirements of 
the very offense with which she was charged.104 In either sort 
of jurisdiction, though, the same basic strategy is at work: 
The defendant’s liability hinges on the identification, in the 
earlier moment, of a substitute locus of moral blame.105 
The same strategy is at work, though somewhat less 
explicitly, in the voluntary intoxication cases. Everybody 
agrees that extreme intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, 
can make compliance with the criminal law very difficult, 
either by impairing the defendant’s ability to control his 
conduct or by impairing his capacity for awareness.106 In 
cases where the defendant’s intoxication is voluntary, 
though, courts usually deny any mitigating effect to the 
defendant’s intoxication. They deny him the opportunity to 
invoke the excuse defense that’s available to involuntarily 
 
 102. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2011) (providing that 
necessity defense is not available unless the necessitous situation was “developed 
through no fault of the actor”); Marc O. DeGirolami, Culpability in Creating the 
Choice of Evils, 60 ALA. L. REV. 597, 599–600 (2009) (“[M]any American 
jurisdictions . . . bar[] the [necessity] defense when the actor was at all culpable 
in creating the necessity.”). 
 103. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604(c) (West 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302(2) 
(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103(2) (West 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-1407(2) (West 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3(II) (1973); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 503(b) (1973). 
 104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985); Robinson, supra note 82, 
at 31. 
 105. Johnson, supra note 70, at 548. 
 106. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (providing that 
involuntary intoxication, whose effect on the actor’s mental processes in the 
moment of the criminal act is the same as voluntary intoxication, will absolve the 
actor of liability if “by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his 
conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality 
[wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law”). 
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intoxicated actors.107 What’s more, they often deny him as 
well the opportunity even to rely on evidence of his 
intoxication to negate the required mental state for the 
offense.108 The basic rationale for this approach is that, in 
cases where the defendant’s intoxication is so extreme as to 
rob him of awareness or self-control, the defendant’s fault in 
“the moment when he imbibes” supplies a substitute locus of 
blame.109 In effect, the law “postulate[s] a general 
equivalence” between the actor’s culpability in becoming 
extremely intoxicated and the culpability required for the 
charged offense.110 The Model Penal Code commentary 
makes this substitution explicit: “Becoming so drunk as to 
destroy temporarily the actor’s powers of perception is 
conduct that plainly has no affirmative social value to 
counterbalance the potential danger. The actor’s moral 
culpability lies in engaging in such conduct.”111 
The same strategy is at work in the law of criminal 
negligence, too, though its workings are mostly hidden. 
Criminal negligence is distinguished from recklessness by 
the fact that the actor isn’t consciously aware of the risk 
posed by his conduct.112 Whereas the fault of recklessness 
 
 107. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.5(g) (3d ed. 2017) 
(“[Voluntary] intoxication is a defense only if it negatives some required element 
of the crime in question. It is not enough that it puts the defendant in a state of 
mind which resembles insanity. Involuntary intoxication, on the other hand, does 
constitute a defense if it puts the defendant in such a state of mind, e.g., so that 
he does not know the nature and quality of his act or know that his act is wrong, 
in a jurisdiction which has adopted the M’Naghten test for insanity.”). 
 108. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“[T]he usual 
formulation of the rule prior to the Model Code was that intoxication is 
admissible to disprove a ‘specific intent’ that is an element of the crime charged, 
but not to disprove a ‘general intent’ when that is the required mental element.”); 
id. (explaining alternative Model Penal Code approach, under which voluntary 
intoxication can negate the mental states of purposely and knowingly but not the 
mental states of recklessly or negligently”). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. See State v. Boss, 127 P.3d 1236, 1239 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (“The risk 
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inheres in the actor’s conscious acceptance of an unjustified 
risk, the fault of negligence inheres in the actor’s failure to 
be aware, in the moment of the “negligent act,” of a risk of 
which the actor “should be aware.”113 To say that the actor 
“should be aware” of the risk posed by his conduct, however, 
is to say something about the past, not about the present. As 
Herbert Hart said, “if anything is blameworthy [about 
negligence,] it is not the ‘state of mind’ but the agent’s failure 
to inform himself of the facts and so getting into this ‘state of 
mind.’”114 To decide whether the defendant really deserves 
blame, then, the jury has to decide exactly how he got into 
this state of unawareness. The jury has to decide, in the 
words of the Model Penal Code commentary, whether the 
defendant’s failure to advert to the risk was attributable to 
“insensitivity to the interests of other people” or instead was 
attributable merely to a non-culpable “failure to grasp 
them.”115 If it was attributable to insensitivity to the 
interests of other people, then presumably the defendant 
deserves blame for “a series of earlier choices . . . not to 
cultivate a responsible concern for others.”116 
The jury instructions don’t say this, of course. They don’t 
actually ask the jury to decide whether the defendant’s 
failure to advert to the risk betrayed “insensitivity to the 
interests of other people.” Rather, they frame the question, 
as the criminal law so often does, in terms of the “reasonable 
person.” The question, as framed for the jury, is whether the 
defendant’s “failure to perceive” the risk created by his 
conduct “involves a gross deviation from the standard of care 
 
of death required for recklessness and criminally negligent conduct is the same; 
the only difference between the two is whether the defendant was aware of that 
risk.”). 
 113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 114. Hart, supra note 78, at 146; see also SCANLON, supra note 93, at 279 
(explaining that actor’s unawareness of the risk posed by his conduct undercuts 
the inference that his conduct in the moment “indicate[s] a blameworthy attitude 
on [the actor’s] part”). 
 115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 116. Walen, supra note 77, at 383. 
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that a reasonable person would observe in the [defendant’s] 
situation.”117 But this question, though it appears to situate 
the locus of blame in the moment of the ostensibly negligent 
act, doesn’t really do so. When the law asks the jury to 
compare what the defendant perceived,118 or believed,119 or 
felt120 in the moment of the crime to what a reasonable 
person would have perceived, or believed, or felt under the 
circumstances, the law really is asking the jury to decide 
whether the defendant was blameworthy in the past, 
perhaps the remote past. 
To explain: in the moment of the crime itself, the 
defendant chooses what to do, but he doesn’t (or doesn’t 
usually) choose what to perceive, or believe, or feel. What the 
defendant perceives, believes, or feels in the moment of the 
crime is mostly, if not entirely, a product of choices he made 
long before. Past choices about what sort of habits of 
attention to develop, for example, will mostly determine 
what he perceives in the moment of the crime.121 Past choices 
about what sort of dispositions to develop will mostly 
determine what he feels.122 And background beliefs and 
 
 117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 118. See id. (requiring jury to decide whether the defendant’s “failure to 
perceive” the risk represented a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would have observed). 
 119. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (requiring jury to 
decide, in resolving defendant’s claim of self-defense, whether defendant’s belief 
in the necessity of force was “reasonable”). 
 120. See People v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Mich. 1975) (holding that 
duress defense applies only where the “threatening conduct was sufficient to 
create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily 
harm”); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (requiring, as an element 
of the heat-of-passion defense, that the provocative event be sufficient to cause a 
“reasonable man” to “act for the moment from passion rather than reason”). 
 121. See JAMES, supra note 75, at 172 (“What is called our ‘experience’ is almost 
entirely determined by our habits of attention.”). 
 122. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion 
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 356 (1996) (“To avoid the discomfort or 
dissonance associated with holding [anti-social] desires, individuals internalize 
dispositions, outlooks, and tastes that conform to the social norms expressed in 
criminal prohibitions.”). 
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assumptions, developed gradually and long before the 
moment of the crime, will mostly determine what he believes 
in the moment of the crime itself.123 So when the law holds 
the defendant liable because what he perceives, believes, or 
feels at the moment of the crime isn’t what a reasonable 
person would have perceived, believed, or felt under the 
circumstances, the law is really holding him responsible for 
the past choices by which he fashioned his habits, 
dispositions, and background beliefs. 
This probably sounds like a radical or at least 
revisionary point. It’s not. The Model Penal Code’s drafters 
made this very point in explaining why their version of the 
duress defense, like the common law version, included an 
objective component—why it required the defendant to show 
that “a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would 
have been unable to resist” the coercer’s threat.124 The 
drafters acknowledged that this requirement would have the 
effect of denying the defense to a person (1) whose subjective 
fear was severe enough to impair his self-control but (2) 
whose fear was attributable to his exceptional timidity 
rather than to the objective gravity of the threat.125 One 
reason for imposing liability in this setting, the drafters said, 
was that “legal norms and sanctions operate not only at the 
moment of the climactic choice, but also in the fashioning of 
values and character.”126 The fault of the exceptionally timid 
actor, who commits a crime in response to a threat that 
wouldn’t so have affected a person of reasonable firmness, 
lies mostly in the past, when he fashioned his values and 
 
 123. See Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 119, 126 (2008) (“[T]he beliefs we possess at any moment are not 
up to us. We can choose to act or not act on our beliefs, but we cannot choose our 
beliefs.”); A.C. GRAYLING, THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 496 (2019) (summarizing 
the views of Hans-Georg Gadamer: “Behind every thought . . . lies a whole body 
of assumptions and background beliefs . . . .”). 
 124. MODEL PENAL CODE. § 2.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 125. Id. § 2.09 cmt. 2. 
 126. Id. 
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character, not in the moment when he committed the crime. 
III. HEAT OF PASSION AND MORAL HAZARD 
So far, in exploring the criminal law’s strategy for 
resolving its moral-hazard problem, I’ve focused on cases 
where the difficulty for the defendant of complying with the 
criminal law’s demands would, if not for his role in bringing 
about that very difficulty, wholly absolve him of liability—
and where his role in bringing about the difficulty therefore 
must, if he’s to be held liable, provide a self-sufficient 
substitute locus of blame. Sometimes, though, the difficulties 
faced by the defendant only partly absolve him of liability. 
These partly exculpating difficulties, like the wholly 
exculpating kind, sometimes are of the defendant’s own 
creation. And so the question arises whether the defendant’s 
fault in creating these difficulties sometimes can supply a 
supplemental locus of blame, which offsets the mitigating 
effect of the partial defense. 
This question brings us to the defense that is the 
principal focus of this Article, namely, the heat-of-passion 
defense. In its traditional form, the heat-of-passion defense 
requires the defendant to show that he killed the victim in 
an extreme emotional state—a “heat of passion”—triggered 
by a sudden provocation.127 The basic rationale for the 
defense is that the defendant’s extreme emotional state 
causes volitional impairment, though not in a degree 
sufficient to provide a complete defense.128 This volitional 
impairment excuses the defendant’s conduct just enough to 
justify reducing the offense of conviction from murder to 
 
 127. See State v. Smith, 806 N.W.2d 383, 393 (Neb. 2011) (“At common law, 
‘homicide, even if intentional, was said to be without malice and hence 
manslaughter if committed in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 128. See LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 15.2(a) (“The usual type of voluntary 
manslaughter involves the intentional killing of another while under the 
influence of a reasonably-induced emotional disturbance (in earlier terminology, 
while in a ‘heat of passion’) causing a temporary loss of normal self-control.”) 
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manslaughter.129 
Subjective volitional impairment isn’t the whole story, of 
course. The heat-of-passion defense doesn’t just require that, 
as a subjective matter, the defendant’s self-control be 
impaired by an extreme emotional state in the moment of the 
homicidal act. The defense also has, somewhat confusingly, 
an objective component.130 Under this objective, reasonable-
person component, the provocative event that engendered 
the defendant’s extreme emotional state must be of a kind 
that would have engendered an extreme emotional state in a 
“reasonable person,” too.131 If it isn’t, then the defendant will 
be denied the partial defense, and so, if convicted, he will be 
convicted of murder rather than manslaughter, regardless of 
whether his self-control actually was subjectively impaired 
at the moment when he killed his provoker. 
Scholars generally have been at a loss to explain why the 
heat-of-passion defense includes this objective component.132 
After all, if what excuses the emotionally disturbed actor is 
the volitional impairment that accompanies extreme 
emotional states, why would not the defense be available to 
any actor who can show the requisite degree of volitional 
impairment?133 One popular answer to this question is that 
 
 129. See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as 
Partial Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1047 
(2011) (“The central idea is that heat of passion impairs a person’s agency. A 
person affected by extreme anger finds it more difficult to exercise self-control 
than a person in a cooler emotional state.”); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of 
Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 
463–64 (1982) (“[P]rovocation is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based 
upon reduced choice-capabilities.”). 
 130. LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 15.2(b). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 129, at 1033 (“Although the doctrine of 
provocation is acknowledged to exhibit the appearance of both justificatory and 
excusatory characteristics, most scholars treat this as the puzzle to be resolved, 
not the key to understanding the doctrine’s rationale.”); Dressler, supra note 129, 
at 438 (commenting on the prevalent “uncertainty [about] whether the 
[provocation] defense is a sub-species of justification or of excuse”). 
 133. See HORDER, supra note 62, at 95 (“The logic of holding a theory centered 
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the heat-of-passion defense, though it operates primarily as 
an excuse defense, also has a justificatory component. Mitch 
Berman and Ian Farrell, for example, have argued that the 
heat-of-passion defense is both a partial excuse defense and 
a partial justification defense.134 What makes a heat-of-
passion homicide partly justified, on this view, is the 
defendant’s punitive aim.135 The objective component of the 
heat-of-passion defense is designed, on this view, to identify 
just those cases where the victim’s provocative conduct is 
deserving of sanction. Though the defendant’s resort to self-
help in the infliction of “punishment” obviously is misguided, 
the “partially warranting reasons” afforded by his punitive 
aim mitigate his offense.136 
The partial-justification theory doesn’t work. For one 
thing, as even Berman and Farrell appear to acknowledge, it 
fails to explain the requirement of a causal connection 
between (1) the facts that “partly justify” the defendant’s 
conduct and (2) the emotional impairment that partly 
excuses his conduct.137 For another thing, the partial-
justification theory fails entirely to account for a central 
feature of the traditional heat-of-passion defense, namely, 
the requirement that the killing occur before a reasonable 
 
on loss of self-control dictates, in effect, that mitigation should be offered to the 
bad-tempered person who kills upon a punctilio for the same reason as it is 
offered to the even-tempered person who loses self-control in the face of a serious 
provocation.”). 
 134. Berman & Farrell, supra note 129, at 1065. 
 135. See id. at 1088 (arguing that one “factor that affects the gravity of a right 
violation is a worthy motive, such as retaliation for the murder or sexual assault 
of a loved one”); id. at 1093–94 (arguing that retaliatory violence is partly 
justified by the same “reasons customarily invoked to justify state punishment,” 
including “to give [the provoker] what he deserves”; “to prevent [the provoker] 
from victimizing other innocent persons”; “to deter similar acts of aggression by 
others”; and “to express the appropriate degree of moral outrage toward [the 
provoker’s] actions”). 
 136. Id. at 1090. 
 137. See id. at 1104 (acknowledging that their account of the defense would 
not, by itself, preclude assertion of the defense in the absence of a causal 
connection, but asserting that “there are good reasons, consistent with our 
theory, to retain the causation requirement”). 
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person would have cooled off.138 If the killing of the 
defendant’s provoker is partly justified, as Berman and 
Farrell claim, this partial justification endures long after the 
original provocative event. On their view, then, it wouldn’t 
make sense to deny the defense to defendants whose anger 
outlasts the reasonable cooling-off period. Indeed, Berman 
and Farrell tacitly acknowledge as much. Instead of trying to 
account for the defense’s objective cooling-off component, 
they dismiss it in a footnote as not “a central feature of the 
doctrine” and claim, on doubtful authority, that “[n]ot all 
jurisdictions” apply the objective cooling-off component 
anyway.139 
A third, and even more fundamental flaw in the partial-
justification account of the defense’s objective component is 
that the actor’s punitive aims don’t actually provide a partial 
justification, or a “partially warranting reason,” for killing 
another person in anger. In modern societies, as Jeremy 
Horder observes, “it is the state that claims an all-embracing 
authority to act on . . . moral reasons relating to the 
justification for the deliberate infliction of considered 
punishment and retribution.”140 Not only does privately 
inflicted retribution not advance the public interest; it 
 
 138. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (identifying 
as an essential component of the common law defense the “inquiry . . . as to 
whether there intervened between the provocation and the resulting homicide a 
cooling-off period of sufficient duration that the provocation should no longer be 
regarded as ‘adequate’”). 
 139. Berman & Farrell, supra 129, at 1042 n.56 (“To the extent that a 
reasonable cooling-off period is a separate requirement of provocation, it 
nonetheless ought not be treated as a central feature of the doctrine. Not all 
jurisdictions limit provocation to circumstances in which a reasonable person 
would not have had time to ‘cool down.’”). For the proposition “[n]ot all 
jurisdictions” apply this limitation, they rely only on a citation to LaFave. Though 
LaFave does, admittedly, cite three outdated cases for the supposed “minority 
view” on the cooling-off period, even he thinks they’re aberrations inconsistent 
with the underlying rationale for the defense: “It would seem that, on principle, 
if a reasonable-man standard (without regard to defendant’s mental and physical 
peculiarities) is required for provocation . . . , the same standard is equally 
applicable for cooling-off purposes.” LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 15.2(d). 
 140. HORDER, supra note 62, at 176. 
976 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
affirmatively undercuts the public interest by invading the 
state’s monopoly on the infliction of retributive punishment 
and thereby subverting respect for the rule of law. To this 
point, defenders of the partial-justification theory 
presumably would respond that the defendant who acts in 
response to adequate provocation at least believes he’s 
justified. But his beliefs are beside the point. Though the law 
defers to the defendant’s view of the facts in deciding 
whether his actions are justified, it doesn’t defer to his 
values.141 Under the values embodied in the legal systems of 
modern societies, the desire to inflict private moral 
retribution can’t justify physical violence, even partly. 
If heat of passion isn’t really a partial-justification 
defense, though, what explains the defense’s objective 
component? The short answer is that the objective 
component is designed to exclude from the defense’s scope 
those defendants whose extreme emotional reactions were 
attributable to their own blameworthy character traits, 
values, or beliefs.142 If the reasonable person would not have 
been provoked to extreme anger by the supposedly 
provocative event, then we’re justified in inferring that the 
defendant’s anger was attributable to some feature of his 
own psyche—a character trait, perhaps, or a belief—that the 
defendant doesn’t share with the normatively reasonable 
person.143 The defendant deserves blame, then, for the past 
actions by which he fashioned the blameworthy values or 
 
 141. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“[T]he balancing 
of evils [under the choice-of-evils justification defense] is not committed to the 
private judgment of the actor.”). 
 142. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Heat of Passion and Blameworthy Reasons to 
Be Angry, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 409 (2018). 
 143. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 122, at 320 (“The [adequately 
provoked defendant] is entitled to the mitigating consequences of the doctrine not 
because her act produced the best state of affairs or because her anger deprived 
her of control, but rather because her anger was appropriate for someone in her 
situation. The appropriateness of her emotional motivations, moreover, 
distinguish her from a person who kills on the basis of less appropriate or fully 
inappropriate motives.”). 
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dispositions that distinguish him from the reasonable 
person. This past fault offsets the mitigating effects of the 
person’s volitional impairment in the moment of the 
homicidal act. Which means he loses the defense. 
This isn’t a novel idea. When the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code first explained their extreme emotional 
disturbance variant of the heat-of-passion defense, they 
appeared to assume that the point of the defense’s objective 
component was to identify defendants whose extreme 
emotional state was attributable to their deficient or 
blameworthy character traits.144 What’s distinctive about the 
Code variant, as every law student learns, is that it permits 
the jury to consider some, but not all, of the features of the 
defendant’s own psyche in deciding whether the defendant’s 
extreme emotional reaction had a “reasonable 
explanation.”145 Under the Code, the jury is permitted to 
consider, for example, whether the defendant, at the moment 
of the homicidal act, “had just suffered a traumatic injury,” 
whether he was “blind or distraught with grief,” or whether 
he was “experiencing an unanticipated reaction to a 
therapeutic drug.”146 In defense of this approach, the drafters 
explained that the jury first has to exclude all non-
blameworthy explanations for the defendant’s extreme 
emotional state before it can validly infer that his emotional 
state was attributable to shortcomings in his moral 
character. In the drafters’ words, factors like the defendant’s 
grief or drug-impairment “are material” to the objective 
component “because they bear upon the inference as to the 
actor’s character that it is fair to draw upon the basis of his 
act.”147 
Present-day scholars, too, have recognized that the 
 
 144. See State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 829 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 cmt. 5 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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objective component of the heat-of-passion defense is 
designed, at least in part, to punish defendants whose 
characters are deficient.148 Jeremy Horder, for example, has 
argued that the objective component functions in part by 
distinguishing (1) defendants whose anger is rooted in 
correct “judgments of wrongdoing” from (2) defendants 
whose anger is rooted in incorrect or excessive judgments of 
wrongdoing. Judgments of wrongdoing are “products of our 
sets and hierarchies of values, and hence of our moral 
characters and personalities, for which we are . . . 
responsible.”149 So the defendant whose anger is rooted in an 
incorrect or excessive judgment of wrongdoing ultimately is, 
on Horder’s view, “to blame for his moral character.”150 
Another scholar, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, likewise has 
argued that the point of the heat of passion’s objective 
component is to identify cases where “the reason the 
defendant became extremely angry is blameworthy.”151 On 
Witmer-Rich’s account, this “reason the defendant became 
extremely angry” might take the form of a character 
“trait,”152 as in Horder’s account.153 Or it might take the form 
of a “belief”154 or an “attitude.”155 
In the end, though, it doesn’t matter whether the root of 
the defendant’s anger is a belief, an attitude, or a character 
 
 148. See HORDER, supra note 62, at 125–26; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, supra 
note 122, at 320 (“The appropriateness of [adequately provoked defendant’s] 
emotional motivations . . . distinguish her from a person who kills on the basis of 
less appropriate or fully inappropriate motives.”); Witmer-Rich, supra note 142, 
at 409. 
 149. HORDER, supra note 62, at 125. 
 150. Id. at 126. 
 151. Witmer-Rich, supra note 142, at 414. 
 152. Id. at 451. 
 153. HORDER, supra note 62, at 125–27. 
 154. Witmer-Rich, supra note 142, at 438. Witmer-Rich’s draft jury 
instructions make it clear that the jury is to evaluate the belief or attitude in 
which the anger originated: “A defendant’s extreme anger is not ‘reasonable’ if it 
is based on some blameworthy belief, attitude, or trait.” Id. 
 155. Id. 
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trait, or for that matter a disposition, a habit, or a value. 
What matters is just that the objective component of the 
heat-of-passion defense imposes blame for the defendant’s 
past choices—the choices by which he fashioned his 
character, habits, beliefs, etc.—not for the defendant’s choice 
in the moment when he committed the crime. Again, in the 
moment of the crime itself, the defendant chooses what to do; 
he doesn’t choose what to believe, or what to feel, or who he 
is. Accordingly, when the law imposes liability on the basis 
of what the defendant believes or feels or who he is, rather 
than on the basis of what he does, it necessarily is ascribing 
or imputing blame to the defendant for his past choices. 
What the Model Penal Code’s drafters said about the duress 
defense is true of the heat-of-passion defense too: the defense 
doesn’t concern itself exclusively with the defendant’s 
culpability in the moment of the climactic act. It concerns 
itself too with the defendant’s culpability in “the fashioning 
of [his] values and character.”156 
Finally, it’s important to be clear, because the scholars 
sometimes aren’t, about what it means for a defendant’s 
character or beliefs or dispositions to be worthy of blame. 
Fortunately, the jury isn’t really required to decide whether 
the defendant’s character or beliefs “contradict[] the 
fundamental values of the political community,” as some 
scholars have supposed.157 All that matters is whether the 
defendant’s choices about how to constitute himself—about 
how to fashion his values and character—create an 
unjustifiable risk that he eventually will find himself unable 
to comply with the criminal law’s external rules.158 After all, 
 
 156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 157. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 142, at 414 (“[P]rovocation is not adequate if 
the reason the defendant became extremely angry is blameworthy. A belief is 
blameworthy if it contradicts the fundamental values of the political community. 
The blameworthiness principle distinguishes those features of a defendant that 
cannot form a basis for him to argue he was reasonably provoked from those 
features that can properly form the basis of a provocation claim.”). 
 158. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985), which provides that 
where a defendant believes he is justified in using defensive force but is “reckless 
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the heat-of-passion defense’s objective component is a 
strategy for addressing the criminal law’s moral-hazard 
problem. Like other such strategies, it ultimately is designed 
only to ensure that the defendant will be able to live up to his 
obligations under the criminal law when the climactic 
moment arrives. It’s not designed to make him good for 
goodness’s sake.159 
In summary, the heat-of-passion defense doesn’t concern 
itself exclusively with the defendant’s degree of fault in the 
moment when he killed his provoker. The defense’s objective 
component—its requirement that the provocation be 
sufficient to stir even a reasonable person to great anger—is 
designed to identify defendants whose anger was 
attributable to their deficient character, beliefs, or values. In 
cases where the defendant’s anger was attributable to 
deficient character, beliefs, or values, the defendant’s 
culpability in fashioning his character, beliefs, or values 
provides a kind of supplemental locus of blame. The 
defendant’s blameworthiness in these earlier choices 
supplements the blameworthiness associated with the 
killing itself. It offsets the mitigating effect of the defendant’s 
anger. So the culpability associated with the killing itself and 
the culpability associated with the failure to take adequate 




or negligent in having such belief,” the justification afforded by section 3.04 “is 
unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, 
as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.” This section implies, of 
course, that the formation of a belief is blameworthy only when the belief poses 
a “substantial and unjustified risk,” as the Code’s definitions of recklessness and 
negligence provide. 
 159. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”)). 
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IV. CARRYING A GUN IN PUBLIC AS A SUPPLEMENTAL  
LOCUS OF BLAME 
Of course, cultivating a virtuous disposition isn’t the only 
way that you can reduce the risk that you’ll wind up killing 
another person in anger. Another popular and very effective 
way of reducing this risk is by not carrying a loaded gun in 
public. If you don’t have a weapon in your immediate 
possession—in a shoulder holster, say, or under the seat of 
your car—you’re unlikely to have access to a weapon in the 
moments after you’re provoked. You won’t usually find guns 
or knives or bludgeons just lying around in convenience store 
parking lots, for example. And if you don’t have ready access 
to a weapon in the moments after you’re provoked, you’re not 
very likely even to try to kill your provoker, much less to 
succeed.160 Killing someone with your bare hands is difficult, 
as lots of would-be killers have learned.161 Even when it’s 
possible, moreover, it’s usually very gruesome. The 
gruesomeness of, say, slowly and methodically strangling 
another person to death over the course of several minutes is 
likely to dissuade all but the most committed of would-be 
killers.162 
Like the cultivation of a virtuous disposition, then, the 
simple expedient of not carrying a loaded gun dramatically 
reduces the risk that you’ll wind up killing another person in 
anger. So the question arises: Should the failure to avail 
 
 160. See KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 241 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 
1966) (“In human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden 
manslaughter were necessary, because quick killing was impossible anyhow 
. . . .”). 
 161. See id.; see also John Larson, Teen Blogger Murder Trial, NBC NEWS (July 
23, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13962555/ns/dateline_nbc/t/teen-blogger-
murder-trial/#.XxYIJihKg2w (recounting killer’s description of Lauri 
Waterman’s death). 
 162. See LORENZ, supra note 160, at 242 (“The distance at which all shooting 
weapons take effect screens the killer against the stimulus situation which would 
otherwise activate his killing inhibitions . . . . No sane man would even go rabbit 
hunting if the necessity of killing his prey with his natural weapons brought 
home to him the full, emotional realization of what he is actually doing.”). 
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oneself of this expedient have the same legal effect as the 
failure to cultivate a virtuous disposition? As we’ve seen, the 
law of homicide denies the heat-of-passion defense to killers 
whose anger at their provoker was rooted in a character trait 
or habit that isn’t shared by the reasonable person.163 In 
effect, the law treats the defendant’s failure to cultivate a 
virtuous character—his failure to avail himself of this 
opportunity to reduce the risk that he’ll later kill someone 
else in anger—as a supplemental locus of blame, which 
offsets the mitigating effect of the defendant’s anger in the 
moment of the killing itself. Should the law likewise treat the 
decision to carry a loaded gun—that is, the failure to avail 
oneself of this simple alternative method of dramatically 
reducing the risk that one will later kill someone in anger—
as a supplemental locus of blame? 
It probably should. When an individual carries a loaded 
gun in public and then, after being provoked, uses the gun to 
kill another person unlawfully in the heat of passion, the law 
is justified in imputing blame to him on the basis of his 
earlier decision to carry the gun, no less than the law is 
justified imputing blame to an individual who fails to 
cultivate a reasonably virtuous disposition. Moreover, this 
imputation is justified in every case where the defendant 
lacks a compelling justification for carrying a gun. The 
government shouldn’t be required to make a case-specific 
showing that the defendant was, say, reckless or criminally 
negligent in arming himself in the first place. Nor should the 
government be required to make a case-specific showing of 
causation. It shouldn’t be required, that is, to show that the 
defendant’s decision to carry a gun was a cause of the 
subsequent killing. It is enough that the defendant, when he 
committed the homicide, used the gun he was carrying. 
As a preliminary matter, it’s important to acknowledge 
the limitations of the analogy between not carrying a gun, on 
the one hand, and cultivating a virtuous disposition, on the 
 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 130–59. 
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other. The decision not to carry a gun is different in lots of 
respects from the “decision” not to cultivate a virtuous 
disposition. No one just “decides” not to cultivate a virtuous 
disposition. Dispositions good and bad are developed 
gradually over time and “from our very youth,” as Aristotle 
says.164 When the law imputes blame to the defendant for his 
failure to cultivate a virtuous disposition, then, it doesn’t and 
can’t identify a specific choice or series of choices as a locus 
of blame. In stark contrast, the decision to leave one’s home 
with a loaded gun, in the minutes or hours before the 
provocation, is discrete and easily identified. If the law is 
justified in imputing fault to the defendant on the basis of 
his decision to carry a loaded gun, then, this imputation 
probably is justified by factors different than those that 
justify imputing fault to the defendant who fails to cultivate 
a virtuous disposition. 
Voluntary intoxication is a more instructive analogy. 
Again, courts generally deny mitigating effect to voluntary 
intoxication, on the theory that the defendant’s 
blameworthiness in becoming voluntarily intoxicated offsets 
the mitigating effect of any impairment engendered by the 
intoxication.165 As it happens, this general rule has specific 
application in the heat-of-passion context. According to 
Professor LaFave, a voluntarily intoxicated actor who kills 
“does not qualify for the voluntary manslaughter treatment 
where, because of intoxication, he easily loses his self-
control; that is to say, he is to be judged by the standard of 
the reasonable sober man.”166 In other words, voluntary 
intoxication plays the same role in the heat-of-passion 
homicide cases as does a less-than-virtuous disposition: lack 
of self-control that’s attributable to one’s earlier decision to 
become intoxicated won’t exculpate, any more than will lack 
of self-control that’s attributable to the failure to cultivate a 
 
 164. ARISTOTLE, supra note 73, bk. II, ch. 1. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 106–11. 
 166. LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 15.2(b)(10). 
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virtuous disposition. In this setting, as in others, the 
voluntary decision to become intoxicated provides a 
supplemental locus of blame, which offsets the mitigating 
effects of the impairment. 
As it happens, roughly the same factors that justify 
imputing fault to the voluntarily intoxicated actor also 
justify imputing fault to the actor who carries a loaded gun 
in public. First, just as everyone knows about the risks 
associated with extreme intoxication,167 everyone knows 
about the risks posed by firearms. The potential of loaded 
guns to cause fatal injuries to human beings isn’t hidden, as 
it is with some dangerous instrumentalities.168 On the 
contrary, in the usual case this potential to inflict fatal 
injuries is exactly what makes the thought of carrying a gun 
so attractive to the individuals who do so. Moreover, just as 
it makes sense to assume that the defendant was aware 
generally of the risks posed by carrying a loaded firearm in 
public, it also makes sense to suppose that the defendant was 
aware that the risk of shooting somebody in anger was 
among these risks. Knowledge of human nature, like 
knowledge of firearms, is well-dispersed. 
Second, and again like intoxication, carrying a gun 
usually, if not always, has little or no “affirmative social 
value to counterbalance the potential danger.”169 This 
 
 167. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (observing that 
awareness of the risks posed by extreme intoxication are “by now so dispersed in 
our culture” that it makes sense, purely as a factual matter, to suppose that 
everybody shares in this awareness); see also Regina v. Majewski, [1975] 3 All 
ER 296, 299, aff’d sub nom. DPP v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All ER 142 (UK) (“The 
facts are common-place—indeed so commonplace that their very nature reveals 
how serious from a social and public standpoint the consequences would be if men 
could behave as the appellant did and then claim that they were not guilty of any 
offence.”). 
 168. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (“[I]f 
the danger is due to the specific tendencies of the individual thing, and is not 
characteristic of the class to which it belongs, . . . a person to be made liable must 
have notice of some past experience . . . .”). 
 169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (discussing 
intoxication). 
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presumably is why, before the Supreme Court decided 
District of Columbia v. Heller,170 some state and local 
governments either proscribed entirely the carrying of 
loaded guns in public or strictly regulated it.171 They 
balanced the risks and benefits of carrying a loaded gun and 
on that basis concluded that the risks posed by the conduct 
so outweighed the benefits as to justify the imposition of 
criminal liability per se.172 This relative lack of “affirmative 
social value” also is why, presumably, even after the courts 
began striking down statutes that prohibited or strictly 
regulated the carrying of loaded firearms in public, very few 
people—around one in every hundred—actually took 
advantage of their new freedom.173 If carrying a gun had as 
much utility as, say, driving a car—another dangerous 
activity—more people would do it. 
Carrying a gun sometimes does have substantial social 
utility, of course. Some peace officers, for example, have good 
reason for carrying guns. So would a victim of domestic 
 
 170. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 171. See, e.g., Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“California generally prohibits the 
average citizen from carrying a firearm in public spaces, either openly or 
concealed. With a few limited exceptions, the State prohibits open carry 
altogether.”); Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down, 
as violative of the Second Amendment, a District of Columbia statute that 
“confine[d] carrying a handgun in public to those with a special need for self-
defense”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down, as 
violative of the Second Amendment, Illinois’s blanket prohibition on public 
carry). 
 172. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018) (acknowledging 
that Massachusetts, in fashioning its regime for the regulation of public carry, 
“endeavored ‘to prevent the temptation and the ability to use firearms to inflict 
harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself.’”); see also 
Christopher Ingraham, 3 Million Americans Carry Loaded Handguns with Them 
Every Single Day, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:19 PM) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/19/3-million-
americans-carry-loaded-handguns-with-them-every-single-day-study-finds/ (“[In 
2017] a comprehensive analysis of decades of crime data found that states that 
made it easier to obtain concealed-carry permits saw a 10 percent to 15 percent 
increase in violent crime in the decade following the change.”). 
 173. See Ingraham, supra note 172. 
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violence who recently had left her abuser and who 
subsequently had received threats on her life.174 But the 
legislature easily can make accommodations for cases like 
these. It can create an exception to the forfeiture rule for 
cases where, say, the defendant reasonably believed that he 
was in grave danger when he armed himself. Some states 
already use similar provisions to limit the scope of existing 
firearms statutes. Massachusetts, for example, makes 
public-carry licenses available to applicants who have “good 
reason to fear injury to the applicant.”175 The existence of a 
few narrow exceptions wouldn’t undercut the value of the 
forfeiture rule, since few homicide defendants would satisfy 
the exceptions. Certainly not Drejka, whose reason for 
carrying a gun apparently was to enable him to hector other 
people without fear of reprisal. 
If the known risks of carrying a loaded gun far outweigh 
the benefits, does that mean everybody who carries a loaded 
gun is blameworthy? Of course not. In this respect, too, 
carrying a gun is like getting intoxicated. Lots of people get 
intoxicated, just as lots of people carry guns. But we don’t, 
nor could we probably, punish everyone who gets intoxicated 
or carries a gun. Rather, where both intoxication and guns 
are concerned, the blame we impute for the earlier decision—
the decision to get drunk, the decision to arm oneself—is 
based in part on what happens later.176 This is a third respect 
 
 174. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25600 (West 2012) (creating a defense to a charge 
of “carrying a concealed firearm” under Cal. Penal Code § 25400 “when a person 
who possesses a firearm reasonably believes that person is in grave danger 
because of circumstances forming the basis of a current restraining order issued 
by a court against another person who has been found to pose a threat to the life 
or safety of the person who possesses the firearm”). 
 175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131(d) (West 2021); see also, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 26045 (West 2012) (“Nothing in Section 25850 is intended to 
preclude the carrying of any loaded firearm, under circumstances where it would 
otherwise be lawful, by a person who reasonably believes that any person or the 
property of any person is in immediate, grave danger and that the carrying of the 
weapon is necessary for the preservation of that person or property.”). 
 176. Cf. Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 MIND 198, 201 (1986) (arguing 
that the results of a defendant’s conduct—the fact that his driving causes an 
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in which carrying a gun is akin to voluntary intoxication: 
From the fact that the intoxicated person wound up 
committing a crime under the influence of alcohol, we infer 
that his decision to imbibe was culpable. Likewise, from the 
fact that the person who armed himself later wound up using 
the gun to kill another person unlawfully, it makes sense to 
infer that his decision to carry a gun was culpable. 
This backwards-looking inference—from the homicide to 
the defendant’s culpability in arming himself—isn’t perfect, 
of course. But it’s probably the best the law can do under the 
circumstances. Because the defendant’s fault in this setting 
will depend on what he knows from personal experience 
about, say, his powers of self-control and his vulnerability to 
anger, it wouldn’t be realistic to require the government 
affirmatively to prove the defendant’s fault; it wouldn’t be 
realistic to require the government to prove that the 
defendant was, say, reckless or negligent in overlooking the 
risk that he would use the firearm to kill someone in 
anger.177 In this fourth respect, too, the imputation of blame 
for carrying a firearm is justified for the same reasons as the 
imputation of blame for intoxication: The knowledge that 
bears on the risks associated with intoxication, like the 
knowledge that bears on the risks associated with carrying a 
gun, is mostly self-knowledge. And so, as the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code observed, “litigating the foresight of a 
particular actor at the time when he imbibes” would pose 
 
accident, for example—sometimes justify an inference that the conduct was 
culpable); Gayle Heriot, The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the 
Law of Tort, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 151 (1994) (same); but see Eric A. 
Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 IOWA L. REV. 59, 123–25 
(2005) (criticizing both Richards and Heriot and arguing that the results of a 
defendant’s conduct “take[] us only a tiny step toward proof of fault”). 
 177. Cf. Wagner, supra note 88, at 79–80 (“Because of the court’s informational 
restraints, it seems impossible [in a fault-based regime] to preserve the 
promisor’s incentives to take efficient precautions against non-performance.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 20 cmt. b (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (“Claims that a defendant’s 
entire activity is negligent are difficult to bring, [in part] because of problems 
involved in gathering all the relevant information . . . .”). 
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“impressive difficulties.”178 Both where intoxication and 
where arming oneself are concerned, then, the only 
alternative to imputing fault on the basis of how things 
turned out is conferring impunity on defendants for their role 
in creating the very difficulties that supposedly excuse their 
crimes. 
The defendant’s fault in the earlier moment when he 
armed himself, whether imputed or proved, probably 
wouldn’t justify enhancing his punishment for the homicide 
unless his fault in this earlier moment was connected 
causally to the victim’s death. So, is proof that the defendant 
used the gun to kill the victim sufficient to prove that his 
decision to carry a gun caused the victim’s death? It is. 
Granted, it isn’t sufficient to prove but-for causation. In rare 
cases, the defendant might be able to argue plausibly that if 
he hadn’t used the gun to kill the victim, he would have found 
another way. But it wouldn’t make sense to require but-for 
causation in this context, any more than it would make sense 
in the accomplice liability context. When an accomplice is 
charged with murder for supplying the murder weapon to the 
principal, the government isn’t, and realistically couldn’t be, 
required to prove that the principal wouldn’t have succeeded 
in carrying out the murder without the accomplice’s help.179 
It is enough to show, rather, that the accomplice’s aid 
“contributed” to the result.180 It is enough that the aid “be 
shown to have put the deceased at a disadvantage, to have 
 
 178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 179. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 391 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Pa. 1978) (“Once it has 
been determined that [the defendant] was an accomplice, proof that the principal 
caused the death satisfies the requirement of establishing the causal relationship 
of the accomplice.”); Eric A. Johnson, Cause-in-Fact After Burrage v. United 
States, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1727, 1761 (2016) (explaining why “courts consistently 
have taken the view that an accomplice’s conduct need not be a but-for cause”). 
 180. See State v. Davis, 356 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. 1987) (“In cases where a 
defendant is prosecuted as an accessory before the fact to murder, the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions or statements of the defendant 
somehow caused or contributed to the actions of the principal, which in turn 
caused the victim’s death.”). 
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deprived him of a single chance at life.”181 This contribution 
test always will be satisfied where the defendant uses the 
gun he is carrying to kill the victim. He’ll always be his own 
accomplice, in other words.182 
So far, I’ve really only sketched a possible answer to the 
question whether we’d be justified, as a society, in treating 
the defendant’s decision to carry a loaded gun in public as a 
supplemental locus of blame, sufficient to offset the 
mitigating effect of the heat-of-passion defense. In the three 
Parts that follow, I’ll fill in a lot of what’s missing from this 
crude sketch. I’ll focus in particular on three questions: (1) 
Does risk of the kind that’s posed by an actor’s decision to 
carry a gun—self-mediated risk, as I’ll call it— ever really 
justify the ascription of moral blame? (2) If we’re justified in 
imputing blame to decisions like Drejka’s decision to carry a 
firearm, why doesn’t the law ever treat decisions like these 
as freestanding bases for criminal liability? (3) Does an 
imputation of fault, like the one I’m urging, really provide an 
adequate substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
offense-specific culpability? 
V. CAN SELF-MEDIATED RISK MAKE CONDUCT  
MORALLY WRONGFUL? 
In the usual criminal case, what makes conduct wrongful 
is the risk it creates. In Holmes’s words: “In the 
characteristic type of substantive crime acts are rendered 
criminal because they are done under circumstances in 
which they will probably cause some harm which the law 
seeks to prevent.”183 As we’ve described it, the moral 
 
 181. State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738–39 (Ala. 1894). 
 182. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“When causing a 
particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing 
such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the 
kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the 
commission of the offense.”). 
 183. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 75. 
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wrongfulness of carrying a loaded gun is of just this kind. 
What makes carrying a loaded gun wrong, I’ve argued, is the 
risk that someone will die. 
But the risk posed by carrying a gun also is different, in 
a way, from the risks that usually provide the bases for 
criminal prosecutions. In the usual case, the risks that 
provide the bases for a criminal prosecution are mediated 
either (1) by the “working of natural causes,”184 as where the 
defendant causes a sleeping homeowner’s death by setting 
fire to his residence; or (2) by the actions of other people, as 
where the defendant causes another person’s death by 
lending his car keys to a drunk friend. By contrast, most or 
all of the risks posed by the defendant’s decision to carry a 
gun are mediated by the defendant’s own future volitional 
actions. Unless the defendant himself later decides, 
volitionally, to remove the gun from its holster and fire it, his 
decision to carry the gun almost certainly won’t wind up 
causing harm to anybody. The only risks posed by the 
decision to carry the gun are self-mediated risks, then.185 
Do self-mediated risks bear on the wrongfulness of an 
actor’s conduct in the same way that other sorts of risk do? 
As it happens, this question has been the subject of 
disagreement among moral philosophers since the 1970s.186 
The philosophers are divided into two camps. “Actualists” 
take the view that predictions about an actor’s future 
conduct—about the actor’s “own future moral mistakes”—
are among the circumstances that bear on the wrongfulness 
of his present conduct.187 “Possibilists,” by contrast, take the 
 
 184. Id. at 67. 
 185. See generally Johnson, supra note 70, at 537–65. 
 186. See Derek Baker, Knowing Yourself—And Giving Up on Your Own Agency 
in the Process, 90 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 641, 642 (2012) (recounting debate 
between “actualists” and “possibilists”); MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN, THE CONCEPT OF 
MORAL OBLIGATION 189 (1996) (explaining that the question whether self-
mediated risk bears on moral obligations “can be couched in terms of two broad 
doctrines, which have come to be called ‘actualism’ and ‘possibilism’”). 
 187. Torbjörn Tännsjö, Moral Conflict and Moral Realism, 82 J. PHIL. 113, 115 
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view that an actor’s present moral obligations are defined not 
by what the actor would or might do in the future but by 
what he has the capacity to do in the future—by “what is 
possible for the agent.”188 For the possibilist, then, the risk 
that Michael Drejka would use his .40 caliber Glock handgun 
to kill another person unlawfully in anger did not bear on the 
wrongfulness of his decision to carry the gun with him when 
he ventured into public on the day he killed McGlockton, 
since Drejka had the capacity all along to control his later 
conduct. 
Though criminal-law theorists generally have ignored 
this philosophical debate, most appear to have assumed, 
albeit without putting it this way, that the morality at work 
in the criminal law is possibilist, rather than actualist.189 
 
(1985) (“[A]n action of ours is wrong if, instead of performing it, we could have 
acted otherwise so that the consequences in the circumstances would have been 
better; my own future moral mistakes as well as the moral mistakes made by 
others are then taken to be part of the circumstances.”); see also Holly S. 
Goldman, Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection, 85 PHIL. REV. 449, 486 (1976) 
(arguing that the moral status of a current act depends partly on “the nature of 
the subsequent acts it would in fact lead the agent to perform”); Frank Jackson 
& Robert Pargetter, Oughts, Options, and Actualism, 95 PHIL. REV. 233, 233, 255 
(1986) (defending “actualism,” which the authors define as “the view that the 
values that should figure in determining which option is the best and so ought to 
be done out of a set of options are the values of what would be the case were the 
agent to adopt or carry out that option”); Jennie Louise, I Won’t Do It! Self-
Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation, 146 PHIL. STUD. 327, 327 
(2009) (arguing that “predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral 
obligations”). 
 188. Louise, supra note 187, at 328 (“‘Possibilism’[] holds that predictions of 
wrongdoing are not relevant, and that we should evaluate each option according 
to what is possible for the agent were that option to be chosen.”); see also Holly S. 
Goldman, Doing the Best One Can, in VALUES AND MORALS 209 (Alvin Goldman 
& Jaegwon Kim eds., 1978) (“[W]e must conclude that the acts an agent would 
perform if he performed a given act are not to be counted as relevant 
circumstances in assessing the moral status of a given act.”); ZIMMERMAN, supra 
note 186, at 190 (defining possibilism as the view that “S ought (overall) to do A 
if what could happen if S did A is deontically superior to what could happen if S 
performed any alternative action”); id. at 206 (“[A]ctualism has unacceptable 
implications, whereas possibilism does not. It is clear which is preferable.”). 
 189. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate 
Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1169 (1997) (“[F]or an act to be 
culpable, the act must appear to the defendant to increase the risks to others in 
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David Luban has said, for example, that an actor’s conduct 
can’t qualify as morally wrongful if the actor’s “later self [will 
have] an opportunity to reconsider and abandon a course of 
action that might turn out to be [criminal].”190 Larry 
Alexander and Kim Ferzan have articulated the underlying 
intuition still more clearly: “[F]or an act to be culpable, the 
act must appear to the defendant to increase the risks to 
others in a way that is not dependent on [the] defendant’s 
future choices. In other words, [a] defendant cannot view his 
own future choices as matters subject to his prediction.”191 
At first glance anyway, the case law too appears to 
support this conventional, possibilist view. If self-mediated 
risk really could make a defendant’s conduct wrongful, then 
one would expect to find cases where the courts had imposed 
liability for, say, reckless endangerment on the basis of risks 
that were mediated by the defendant’s own future conduct.192 
One doesn’t. For example, in cases where a defendant is 
prosecuted for reckless endangerment on the basis of his 
possession of a firearm, courts always assume that the 
 
a way that is not dependent on defendant’s future choices. In other words, [a] 
defendant cannot view his own future choices as matters subject to his 
prediction.”); Andrew Ashworth, The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession 
Offenses, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 237, 250–51 (2011) (arguing that the risk mediated 
by the actor’s own future conduct cannot make his present conduct wrongful, 
since he or she “may undergo a change of mind”); R.A. Duff, Criminalizing 
Endangerment, 65 LA. L. REV. 941, 964 (2005) (“[T]he law should not prohibit 
intrinsically harmless conduct on the mere grounds that the agent might go on 
to create a risk of harm . . . . “); David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 
957, 972 (1999) (arguing that an actor’s conduct cannot qualify as wrongful if the 
actor’s “later self [will have] an opportunity to reconsider and abandon a course 
of action that might turn out to be [criminal]”); A.P. Simester & Andrew Von 
Hirsch, Remote Harms and Non-Constitutive Crimes, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 89, 
97–98 (2009) (arguing that risks mediated by the actor’s own future conduct 
cannot make his present conduct wrongful). 
 190. See Luban, supra note 189, at 972. 
 191. Alexander & Kessler, supra note 189, at 1169; see also Duff, supra note 
189, at 964 (“[T]he law should not prohibit intrinsically harmless conduct on the 
mere grounds that the agent might go on to create a risk of harm . . . .”). 
 192. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“Virtually every 
modern [criminal code] revision effort follows the Model Code in including a 
[reckless endangerment offense].”). 
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conviction must be grounded either (1) on risks mediated by 
“the working of natural causes,” like the risk that the gun 
will go off accidentally;193 or (2) on risks mediated by the 
actions of other people, like the risk that somebody else will 
react violently.194 Courts don’t ever invoke the risk that the 
defendant himself will wind up firing the gun deliberately. 
Does that mean that, as the possibilists claim, self-
mediated risk can’t make an actor’s conduct wrongful? 
Actually, no. First of all, self-mediated risk plays an 
indispensable role in lots of perfectly uncontroversial 
criminal law doctrines. Consider, for example, how the 
criminal law handles cases like Trish’s. Trish, as you will 
recall, stupidly went four-wheeling in a blizzard and then, 
after she got stuck, broke into an unoccupied cabin to keep 
from freezing to death. In Trish’s case, as most would agree, 
her conduct in breaking into the cabin was justified by 
necessity.195 At the same time, however, just about 
everybody also would agree that Trish should be criminally 
liable for breaking into the hunting lodge.196 Since Trish’s 
 
 193. See, e.g., People v. Malcolm, 902 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2010), where the 
defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment was based on evidence that he 
had reloaded his rifle while aiming it at another man and then had struggled 
with the other man for control of the rifle. In concluding that this conduct had 
created a “grave risk of death,” the appellate court relied only on the possibility 
that the loaded rifle might have discharged accidentally. Id. at 268. The court did 
not rely on several facts that suggested Malcolm wanted to kill the other man 
and probably would have done so if only he had succeeded in regaining control of 
the rifle. The court did not rely, for example, on the fact that Malcolm had tried 
to shoot the same man just seconds before—an act for which he was convicted 
separately of attempted murder. Id. at 266. Nor did it rely on the fact that 
Malcolm, as he struggled with the other man for control of the rifle, repeatedly 
said to him, “You ruined my life.” Id. at 267. Nor, finally, did the court rely on the 
fact that Malcolm had brought more than 60 rounds of ammunition with him to 
the scene of the confrontation. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 A.2d 709, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) 
(“Another circumstance in which a reaction to the accused’s conduct could supply 
the element of actual danger of harm is where the pointing of an unloaded gun 
could trigger retaliatory gunfire.”). 
 195. See LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 10.1(d)(1) (explaining elements of necessity 
defense). 
 196. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 70, at 39 (acknowledging Trish’s 
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justified conduct in breaking into the cabin wasn’t wrongful, 
her fault must instead inhere in her decision to go four-
wheeling in a blizzard.197 If this earlier moment is the locus 
of Trish’s fault, however, then it follows that her fault is 
predicated on self-mediated risk. After all, the only risks 
posed by Trish’s earlier decision to go four-wheeling, apart 
from the risk to Trish herself, were risks mediated by her 
own future conduct—by the possibility that Trish would, say, 
break into an unoccupied cabin.198 In cases like Trish’s, then, 
the criminal law necessarily assumes that self-mediated risk 
bears on wrongfulness. 
Self-mediated risk plays an indispensable role in lots of 
other cases, too. Among these are the many and varied cases 
where the law requires the jury to compare what the 
defendant perceived, believed, or felt in the moment of the 
criminal act to what a reasonable person would have 
perceived, believed, or felt.199 In these cases, as we’ve seen, 
the real locus of blame is the past decisions by which the 
defendant cultivated the wrong dispositions, habits, or 
beliefs—that is, the dispositions, habits, or beliefs that 
 
culpability). 
 197. Robinson, supra note 82, at 31 (arguing that the actor’s liability in the 
“causing conditions” cases must be “based on his initial conduct in causing the 
defense conditions with the accompanying [mental state], not on the justified or 
excused conduct that he subsequently performs”); Garvey, supra note 123, at 165 
(acknowledging that in causing-conditions cases like Trish’s “the only thing the 
actor has chosen to do that he should not have done is risk exposing himself to a 
threat he ought instead have chosen to avoid”). 
 198. Of course, the risk to Trish herself from this earlier conduct wasn’t 
mediated by her own later conduct. She might have frozen to death even without 
doing anything further. But risk to the safety of the defendant herself, though it 
might make her conduct in the earlier moment imprudent, would not make her 
conduct wrongful. What makes conduct wrongful is danger to another person’s 
life, limb, or property. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER ON TORTS § 65, at 453 (5th 
ed. 1984) (explaining that “contributory negligence,” whereby the actor creates a 
risk of harm to himself, isn’t really negligence at all, since negligence is conduct 
that “creates an undue risk of harm to others”); cf. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 35–36 (1987) (asserting that no 
wrong has occurred if the actor voluntarily inflicts harm upon himself or freely 
assumes the risk of harm-causing activity). 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 117–26. 
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distinguish him from the reasonable person. What makes 
these past decisions blameworthy, though, can only be self-
mediated risk. An individual’s dispositions, habits, and 
beliefs can’t cause cognizable harm to others except through 
the medium of the individual’s own future actions. Thus, 
when the law denies the duress defense to a defendant whose 
fear was attributable to his exceptional timidity, and so 
imputes blame to the defendant for his earlier “fashioning of 
values and character,”200 this blame is justified only by self-
mediated risk—only by the risk that the defendant’s timidity 
will cause him to harm another person by act or omission. 
So the first reason why the criminal law can’t be 
possibilist is that the criminal law frequently assigns weight 
to self-mediated risk. The second reason is even more 
compelling: possibilism doesn’t make any sense. According to 
possibilists, again, the reason why we can’t assign weight to 
predictions about the defendant’s own future conduct is that 
the defendant himself controls what he does in that future 
moment.201 Depending on what they mean by this claim, 
though, the claim either is inconsequential or utterly false. 
If possibilists mean by this that the defendant has the power 
in the future moment, T2, to control what he does in that 
moment, then their claim is true but inconsequential, since 
the decision we’re evaluating is the decision at T1. If instead 
possibilists mean that the defendant has the power in the 
earlier moment, T1, to control what he does at T2, then their 
claim is just false. Of course, an individual has the power to 
influence his own future conduct by forming plans or making 
resolutions. Human beings are, as Michael Bratman has 
said, “planning creatures.”202 Because human beings have 
the ability to plan for the future, and to resolve to follow 
through, an actor’s orientation to his future conduct is never 
 
 200. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 201. See authorities cited supra note 187. 
 202. Michael Bratman, Taking Plans Seriously, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 271, 
271 (1983). 
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exclusively predictive. But that doesn’t mean, of course, that 
the actor exercises volitional control at T1 over what he’ll do 
later, at T2. Plans and resolutions sometimes prove 
ineffectual.203 
In this respect, the actor’s present self—his self at T1—
bears a relationship to the actions of his future self, at T2, 
that is not fundamentally different from his relationship to 
the actions of other people.204 He has the power to exert 
influence over his future self by making plans and 
resolutions, much as he has power to exert influence over 
other people by making arguments and exhortations. But 
both powers are way less than perfect.205 And both powers 
are, moreover, different in kind from the actor’s volitional 
control over what he does at T1. Because the actor’s power at 
T1 to control what he does later, at T2, is less than perfect, he 
sometimes is morally obligated to consider at T1 the 
probabilities associated with his future conduct at T2. As 
Torbjörn Tännsjö has rightly argued: “We ought not to lend 
our friend our car if we suspect that he will drive heavily 
drunk, even if he could make good use of it. But, by the same 
 
 203. See Baker, supra note 186, at 644 (“I am in control of what I will do in the 
future. But the control seems imperfect. Years of experience with my future self 
have taught me that, despite the intimacy of our relationship, he frequently lets 
me down.”); David Brooks, The Machiavellian Temptation, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 2, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/brooks-the-machiavellian-
temptation.html (“You usually can’t change your behavior simply by resolving to 
do something. If that were true, New Year’s resolutions would actually work. 
Knowing what to do is not the same as being able to do it. If [it were], people 
would find it easier to lose weight.”); DUA LIPA, NEW RULES (Universal Music Grp. 
2017) (“Don’t be his friend, you know you’ll only wake up in his bed in the 
morning.”). 
 204. Johnson, supra note 70, at 553; cf. Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 
PHIL. REV. 3, 17, 26 (1971) (arguing that “what matters in the continued existence 
of a person are, for the most part, relations of degree” and that among the 
relations of degree that define the continued existence of a person is “the relation 
between an intention and a later action”). 
 205. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (2009) (“[I]t is 
an illusion to think that the surface of our skin marks any break in the degree of 
our control, that we lack control over what happens in the outside world while we 
have control of what goes on inside.”). 
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token, we must take our own future mistakes into account. 
Both kinds of mistakes determine what the consequences of 
our [present] actions will be.”206 
It’s hard to imagine a clearer illustration of this point 
than Michael Drejka’s case. When Drejka left his home on 
the day of Marquis McGlockton’s death, Drejka knew that he 
was short-tempered and that he had threatened other people 
with guns at least once before.207 He also knew that he had a 
tendency to confront other people over their perceived moral 
transgressions—in particular, people who park in 
handicapped spots had “always touched a nerve” with him, 
he said.208 He knew, moreover, that these confrontations had 
the potential to “go sideways.”209 He even told a convenience 
store owner who confronted him about his conduct, “I cannot 
help it. I get myself in trouble.”210 Finally, he knew that he 
had at his disposal a wholly effective expedient for 
preventing his temper from causing anybody serious harm, 
namely, leaving his gun at home. To argue that Drejka, when 
he left his home with a loaded gun on the day of McGlockton’s 
death, had no moral obligation to consider the probabilities 




 206. Tännsjö, supra note 187, at 115. 
 207. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 45, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 208. Tamara Lush, Newly Released Records Show Lead-Up to Parking Lot 
Shooting, AP NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://apnews.com/406e79bcdef44b428c39 
56d082329981/Newly-released-records-show-lead-up-to-parking-lot-shooting. 
 209. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 47, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 210. Id. at 46. 
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VI. WHY THE LAW IMPOSES LIABILITY FOR SELF-MEDIATED 
RISK ONLY AFTER THE RISK COMES TO FRUITION IN HARMFUL 
(OR RISK-UNLEASHING) CONDUCT 
One difficulty with the argument in the preceding Part 
is that the choices it identifies as bases for imposing or 
enhancing punishment—choices about what to believe, for 
example, and choices about what kinds of character traits to 
develop—aren’t the kinds of choices we ordinarily think of as 
suitable bases for punishment. To the contrary, these are the 
sorts of choices we usually think of as fundamental to 
individual liberty and therefore beyond the government’s 
reach in a liberal society. The same thing is true, moreover, 
of a person’s decision to carry a firearm, which is protected 
by the Second Amendment.211 So we’ve got a kind of paradox: 
On the one hand, legislatures don’t and probably couldn’t 
create freestanding criminal offenses that require the 
government merely to prove that the defendant made bad 
choices about, say, what to believe or what sort of character 
to develop. On the other hand, these very same choices 
appear sometimes to serve as substitute or supplemental loci 
of blame in prosecutions for other offenses. Isn’t that 
inconsistent? 
Notice first that this same paradox is present, albeit in a 
less troubling form, even in the Trish hypothetical.212 
Everybody agrees that Trish would be subject to prosecution 
for breaking into the boarded-up cabin. And everybody 
agrees too, I hope, that the real locus of culpability in this 
prosecution is Trish’s decision to go four-wheeling in a 
blizzard, rather than her decision to break in. What’s 
paradoxical about this conclusion is that Trish clearly 
wouldn’t have been subject to prosecution if the risk posed by 
her decision to go four-wheeling hadn’t come to fruition. 
Some states have inchoate property-endangerment offenses 
 
 211. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects the right of an individual to keep and bear arms). 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. 
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that prohibit recklessly creating a risk of harm to another 
person’s property.213 As we’ve seen, though, self-mediated 
risk—the kind of risk posed by Trish’s decision to go four-
wheeling—doesn’t figure in prosecutions for inchoate 
endangerment offenses.214 So there’s a paradox: Trish’s fault 
supposedly inheres in her decision to go four-wheeling, but 
her decision to go four-wheeling wouldn’t provide a 
freestanding basis for prosecution. 
In Trish’s case at least, the legislature probably could 
decide to criminalize, if it wanted to, the choice that provides 
the substitute locus of fault. If it wanted to, the legislature 
could decide to create, say, a misdemeanor offense of “four-
wheeling in a blizzard,” on the theory that people who go 
four-wheeling in blizzards too often wind up breaking into 
other people’s property to avoid freezing to death. In fact, 
legislatures occasionally do adopt criminal statutes that, in 
substance if not in form, punish the inchoate creation of self-
mediated risk. Statutes that prohibit possession of firearms 
by convicted felons appear to be of this kind: They appear to 
be addressed to the risk that the felon will later misuse the 
firearm volitionally.215 
It seems doubtful, though, whether the legislature also 
could decide to create offenses that criminalize, say, the 
formation of certain beliefs or the cultivation of certain 
character traits, even if the beliefs and character traits 
 
 213. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.25 (McKinney 2009) (“A person is guilty of 
reckless endangerment of property when he recklessly engages in conduct which 
creates a substantial risk of damage to the property of another person in an 
amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.”). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 192–94. 
 215. See Alexander C. Barrett, Taking Aim at Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 163, 197 (2013); MOORE, supra note 37, at 21; United States v. Skoien, 614 
F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court relied in part on a similar 
rationale in upholding the federal law criminalizing so-called “partial-birth 
abortion” in Gonzales v. Carhart. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). The Court said that the 
statute advanced the government’s legitimate interest in cultivating “respect for 
life” in physicians who perform abortions. Id. at 158. The risk posed by physicians 
who lack respect for human life is, of course, self-mediated. 
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enhance the long-term risk that the individual will wind up 
harming someone else. In a free society, as the Supreme 
Court frequently has said, the thoughts and dispositions of 
the individual aren’t really the government’s business: “The 
government ‘cannot constitutionally premise legislation on 
the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.’”216 
So the question naturally arises: If the government can’t 
adopt statutes that punish the formation of beliefs or the 
cultivation of dispositions directly, as freestanding criminal 
offenses, doesn’t it follow that the government also can’t 
punish the formation of beliefs or the cultivation of 
dispositions indirectly, by treating them as substitute or 
supplemental loci of blame in prosecutions for other offenses? 
More to the point, isn’t the same true of the individual’s 
protected decision to carry a gun in public? 
As it turns out, some scholars would make just this 
argument. Stephen Garvey, for example, makes this 
argument in relation to the reasonable-person component of 
self-defense.217 As Garvey astutely observes, this reasonable-
person component does punish individuals for what they 
believe.218 After all, if an individual’s belief that he is 
justified in using force is unreasonable, and if he is denied 
the defense on this basis, then he really is being punished 
not for what he did in the moment of the killing itself, but 
rather for the earlier choices by which he acquired his 
 
 216. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (quoting Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); see also, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (stating that “in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State”); Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (stating that “[t]he fantasies of 
a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government”); Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (noting that “[o]ur whole constitutional 
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s 
minds”). 
 217. Garvey, supra note 123, at 170. 
 218. See id. at 135–40 (identifying the reasonable-belief requirement as a 
forfeiture rule, which—like other forfeiture rules—punishes the defendant for his 
choice at an earlier moment in time). 
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belief.219 For Garvey, however, this makes the reasonable-
person component problematic. According to Garvey, if it 
were permissible to punish individuals for their 
unreasonable beliefs after these beliefs come to fruition in 
harm to others, then it also would be permissible to punish 
individuals for their unreasonable beliefs before they come to 
fruition in harm to others.220 Which it obviously isn’t, at least 
in a liberal society.221 So, according to Garvey, the 
reasonable-person component of self-defense is 
illegitimate.222 
Garvey makes roughly the same argument in relation to 
the objective component of the heat-of-passion defense. 
According to Garvey, if the defense’s objective component—
its requirement that the provocation be sufficient to stir even 
a reasonable person to great anger—really is designed to 
punish defendants whose anger is attributable to deficient 
 
 219. Id. The Model Penal Code makes this aspect of the reasonable-belief 
standard explicit by replacing it with a requirement that the government, to 
defeat the defendant’s self-defense claim, prove that the defendant was reckless 
or negligent in forming the belief that he was under attack or that force was 
necessary to repel the attack. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 220. Garvey, supra note 123, at 165, 169. 
 221. Id. at 155 (“Any recognizably liberal society has no authority to punish its 
citizens for who they are, no matter the content of their character.”). 
 222. To roughly the same end, Garvey also argues that individuals don’t choose 
their beliefs and that “a liberal state cannot punish an actor for a choice he never 
made.” Id. at 162. He acknowledges that an individual’s beliefs are influenced 
indirectly by his choices—choices about what sorts of information to gather or 
expose himself to, for example. Id. at 161–62. But the relationship between these 
choices and the individual’s beliefs is, Garvey says, “too weak” to support 
punishing him on the basis of his beliefs. Id. at 162. Beliefs would justify 
punishment only if individuals chose their beliefs “directly”—only, that is, if they 
had direct volitional control over what they believe. Id. at 160. He makes roughly 
the same argument in relation to character. Id. at 155–56. Garvey doesn’t really 
defend his decision to assign dispositive weight to the distinction between choices 
that influence beliefs and character traits directly and choices that influence 
beliefs and character traits indirectly. And it’s obviously problematic. Consider 
intoxication. It’s true that nobody has the ability just to decide in the moment 
whether to be intoxicated or impaired; we influence our intoxication only 
indirectly, by taking drinks of alcoholic beverages. But nobody would argue on 
this basis that we’re not accountable for our voluntary intoxication. 
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character, then this objective component is illegitimate.223 
The major premise of his argument appears to be the same 
as it was with respect to the reasonable-person component of 
self-defense: If it were permissible to punish individuals for 
their vicious dispositions after these dispositions come to 
fruition in harm to others, then it also would be permissible 
to punish individuals for their vicious dispositions before 
they come to fruition.224 It’s obviously not permissible to 
punish individuals for their vicious dispositions before these 
dispositions come to fruition in harm to others, at least in a 
liberal society.225 It follows, then, that it’s also not 
permissible to punish individuals for their vicious 
dispositions after they come to fruition in harm to others, as 
the heat-of-passion defense does. 
Garvey doesn’t really defend the shared major premise 
of these two arguments, namely, that the government’s 
power to punish beliefs and dispositions necessarily is the 
same after the beliefs and dispositions cause harm as 
before.226 But the premise appears to be rooted in his 
conception of liberal society. If freedom of thought really is 
fundamental to liberal society, as it appears to be, then it 
can’t be something that gets cast aside whenever it proves 
inexpedient—whenever other practical concerns are arrayed 
against it. In other words: the protection the law affords 
under ordinary circumstances to choices about what to 
believe, and about how to constitute one’s character, can’t 
just be the product of a balancing of interests. So it can’t be 
contingent on the harmlessness of the individual’s beliefs 
and character choices. It’s absolute. As Garvey says: “[A] 
liberal state worthy of the name cannot take character”—or 
for that matter belief— “to be the ultimate target of state 
 
 223. Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1716 (2005). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Garvey, supra note 123, at 165, 169; Garvey, supra note 223, at 1716. 
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punishment.”227 
Despite its seeming logic, this is a bad argument. For 
starters, the argument would lead to case outcomes that are, 
to say the least, counterintuitive. Consider, for example, the 
case of Stephen Carr, who killed two lesbian hikers on the 
Appalachian Trail after becoming enraged by the “‘show’ put 
on by the women.”228 Of the Carr case, Garvey argues both 
that Carr was free to cultivate an overpowering hatred of 
homosexuals and, at the same time, that Carr ought to have 
been afforded an opportunity to invoke the rage generated by 
this hatred to partly excuse his crime.229 To deny Carr the 
benefit of the heat-of-passion defense, Garvey argues, would 
be to punish Carr for his disposition rather than his 
conduct.230 And to punish Carr for his disposition rather than 
his conduct would be “illiberal,” according to Garvey. 
The consequences of Garvey’s views are even more 
troubling where self-defense is concerned. Garvey himself 
illustrates these consequences by constructing a hypothetical 
“mistaken racist,” who mistakenly becomes convinced, as a 
consequence of his racist beliefs and dispositions,231 that an 
African-American young man on the subway is about to kill 
him, and who subsequently shoots and kills the young man 
in self-defense.232 On Garvey’s view, the mistaken racist 
would be entitled to a complete defense, since to deny him 
the defense would be to punish him not for the shooting itself 
but, rather, for the earlier choices that made him a racist—
for “choos[ing] to act in ways likely to cause him to become or 
remain a racist.”233 A liberal society doesn’t punish choices 
like these before they cause another person’s death— “a 
 
 227. Garvey, supra note 123, at 156–57. 
 228. Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363–64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 229. Garvey, supra note 223, at 1716. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Garvey, supra note 123, at 128. 
 232. Id. at 123–24. 
 233. Id. at 169. 
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liberal state cannot make it a crime to be a racist,”234 Garvey 
says. So neither can it punish choices like these after they 
cause another person’s death. 
The trouble with Garvey’s argument is simple. The fact 
that a principle is very important—like the general principle 
that “one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his 
conscience rather than coerced by the State”235—doesn’t 
mean that it’s not, at bottom, the product of a balancing of 
interests. At least where the criminal law is concerned, lots 
of fundamental principles are the outcome of balancings of 
interests. Take the criminal law’s fundamental distinction 
between acts and omissions, for example. As Michael Moore 
has argued, the reason why the criminal law doesn’t 
ordinarily punish omissions probably is just that the state’s 
interest in punishing wrongful omissions is outweighed, in 
the usual case, by the defendant’s liberty interests.236 For one 
thing, omissions generally are less wrongful than acts.237 For 
another, laws requiring us to act in a particular way are more 
oppressive than laws that merely forbid us to act in a 
particular way.238 So the balance of interests comes out 
differently where failures to act are concerned than where 
voluntary acts are concerned. 
In just the same way, where the choices by which 
individuals fashion their beliefs and characters are 
concerned, the balance comes out differently after these 
choices cause the individual to violate the criminal law than 
 
 234. Id. at 155. 
 235. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
 236. MOORE, supra note 37, at 58; see also ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 109–114 (2009) 
(summarizing Moore’s view). 
 237. MOORE, supra note 37, at 58 (explaining that there is a “very real 
difference . . . in the moral force of our negative versus our positive duties”). 
 238. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 278 (1997) (explaining that “a law 
that (positively) coerces me to do some action takes away more of my liberty than 
does a law that (negatively) coerces me from doing some action” since there are 
lots of ways of conforming with a negative duty and only one way of conforming 
with a positive duty). 
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before. Before the individual violates the criminal law, the 
law rightly forestalls intervention for the sake of permitting 
the individual to decide for himself how to conform his 
conduct to the law. Though a free society has a legitimate 
interest in making its citizens conform their conduct to the 
law, as Antony Duff argues, it has no legitimate interest in 
monitoring exactly how they manage to conform their 
conduct to the law.239 A person might conform his conduct to 
the law by cultivating the right “dispositions of feeling and 
appetite.”240 On the other hand, a person who was not 
virtuous in her disposition might nevertheless manage to 
conform her conduct to the criminal law by exercising self-
control—by successfully struggling “to overcome her own 
feelings.”241 In either event, though, the result is the same. 
Therefore, a free society ought not, Duff argues, to “attend to 
the distinctions between virtue and self-control, and between 
weakness of will and vice.”242 “[S]o long as we do not commit 
what the law defines as crimes,” Duff says, “the law has no 
interest in why we do not commit them.”243 
After the individual violates the criminal law’s external 
rules, however, the balance changes. The reason, basically, 
is that criminal law defenses, and some offense definitions 
too, assign weight to the difficulty for the individual of 
complying with the law’s demands in the moment of the 
criminal act.244 If the law assigns weight to the difficulty for 
the defendant of complying with the law’s demands, it can’t 
 
 239. Duff, supra note 55, at 168; see also HORDER, supra note 62, at 128 
(explaining that it “is not a matter of concern to the criminal law” whether people 
manage to avoid committing crimes by cultivating virtuous dispositions or 
instead manage to avoid committing crimes by exercising self-restraint). 
 240. Duff, supra note 55, at 163. 
 241. Id. at 164. 
 242. Id. at 168 (“[N]ot even the most aspirational perfectionist is likely to want 
to give the criminal law this kind of interest in its citizens’ virtues or vices.”). 
 243. Id. at 168; see also MOORE, supra note 37, at 54 (observing that the 
criminal law “rightly shies away from punishing bad character”). 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 62–67. 
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also forego scrutiny of the choices that led the defendant to 
that pass. It can’t really refuse to distinguish (1) the 
individual who took every precaution against violating the 
criminal law but still found himself in circumstances that 
made compliance with the law impossible or very difficult; 
and (2) the individual who faced similar circumstances but 
only because he neglected to take precautions—only because 
he allowed himself to become violently homophobic, for 
example, or violently racist. If the law doesn’t distinguish 
these individuals, then it will leave individuals with no 
incentive to take precautions against violating the law. It 
will, for example, leave them with no incentive to cultivate 
either virtue or self-control, as Dan Kahan and Martha 
Nussbaum have observed.245 And so, over the long run, the 
criminal law will be less effective than it should be in 
“induc[ing] external conformity to rule.”246 
In the final analysis, this is why the law treats self-
mediated risk differently than other risks: not because self-
mediated risks can’t make choices wrongful, but because the 
balance of interests—the balance of the government’s 
interest in punishing wrongdoing and the defendant’s 
interest in liberty—comes out differently where self-
mediated risks are concerned. As long as the risks posed by 
the defendant’s conduct are self-mediated—as long as the 
defendant’s “later self [will have] an opportunity to 
reconsider and abandon a course of action that might turn 
out to be [criminal]”247—the individual’s interest in deciding 
for himself how to bring his conduct into conformity with the 
law deserves to carry the day. Once the defendant “unleashes 
the risk,” however, the balance changes. Even in a free 
society, the government’s interest in maximizing the 
 
 245. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 122, at 360 (arguing that a criminal law 
crafted on Garvey’s model would tell citizens, “Don’t worry about making yourself 
into the sort of person who gets provoked only by events that are really grave, 
don’t worry about schooling yourself not to lash out in unreasonable ways.”). 
 246. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 49. 
 247. Luban, supra note 189, at 972. 
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individual citizen’s opportunities for moral self-
determination is counterbalanced by its interest in 
preventing conduct that is potentially harmful to other 
people. These two interests are accommodated best by a 
criminal law that intervenes—in the usual case—only after 
the actor has relinquished his last opportunity to control the 
effects of his conduct on other people. 
Finally, just as the decisions by which a person fashions 
his character or beliefs aren’t subject to protection after they 
cause him to commit a crime, nor is a person’s decision to 
carry a firearm in public subject to protection after he uses 
the firearm to kill another person. Though the Second 
Amendment appears generally to protect an individual’s 
right to carry a loaded gun in public,248 lots of statutes 
uncontroversially enhance a defendant’s punishment on the 
basis of the fact that he was carrying a firearm when he 
committed the crime.249 “The right to keep and bear arms in 
lawful self-defense doesn’t include the right to use those 
arms in a crime,” as Eugene Volokh has said.250 Where the 
defendant later uses a gun to kill another person unlawfully, 
then, nothing would prevent the law from assigning weight 
to his decision to carry the gun in public. 
  
 
 248. See Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down, as 
violative of the Second Amendment, a District of Columbia statute that 
“confine[d] carrying a handgun in public to those with a special need for self-
defense”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down, as 
violative of the Second Amendment, Illinois’s blanket prohibition on public 
carry). 
 249. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018) (specifying mandatory sentence 
enhancements for defendants, who in the course of a crime of violence or a drug-
trafficking crime, carry, brandish, or discharge a firearm). 
 250. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and A Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1443, 1537 (2009). 
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VII. WHY WE’RE JUSTIFIED IN IMPUTING FAULT  
TO THE DEFENDANT 
Even if the decision to carry a firearm can, in theory, 
serve as a supplemental locus of blame in a homicide 
prosecution, the question still remains under just what 
circumstances the law is justified in ascribing or imputing 
fault to the defendant for carrying a firearm. I’ve argued that 
the law should impute fault to the defendant on the basis 
merely of two facts: (1) that he was carrying a loaded gun in 
public when the provocative event occurred; and (2) that he 
later used the gun to kill the victim unlawfully and in anger. 
But, of course, imputed fault is disfavored in criminal law. In 
the ordinary case, the jury ought actually to decide, on the 
basis of case-specific evidence, whether the defendant was at 
fault. So the question naturally arises whether imputing 
fault can be justified here. 
As every first-year law student learns, the law generally 
requires the government to prove that the defendant had a 
culpable mental state in relation at least to the “elements 
that make the conduct criminal.”251 In homicide 
prosecutions, for example, the law generally requires the 
government to prove that the defendant, when he engaged in 
the conduct that caused the victim’s death, had a particular 
culpable mental state in relation to the death of a person—
intentionally, perhaps, or recklessly or negligently.252 The 
law doesn’t always require this sort of jury determination, of 
course. Where offenses like drunk-driving homicide are 
concerned, for example, the law requires the government 
only to prove that the defendant knew of the circumstances 
 
 251. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (“In determining 
Congress’ intent, we start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the 
common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable 
mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise 
innocent conduct.’” (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
72 (1994))). 
 252. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (defining offense 
of murder); id. § 210.3 (defining offense of manslaughter). 
2021] WHEN PROVOCATION IS NO EXCUSE 1009 
in which the risk inhered—knew that he had been drinking, 
for example, and knew that he was operating a motor 
vehicle.253 Where offenses like drunk-driving homicide are 
concerned, the circumstances known to the defendant in 
effect provide the basis for an antecedent legislative 
judgment that the conduct was reckless or negligent per 
se.254 
There is a big difference, though, between imputing fault 
on the basis of the facts known to the defendant when he 
acted, as drunk-driving homicide statutes do,255 and 
imputing fault on the basis of how things turned out. The law 
does sometimes impute fault on the basis of how things 
turned out. For example, in prosecutions for sexual abuse of 
a minor, the law of most jurisdictions imputes culpability to 
the defendant in relation to the critical age element purely 
on the basis of the fact that the victim turned out to be 
underage.256 But criminal statutes that impute culpability on 
 
 253. See, e.g., People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87, 89 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); State v. 
Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 563 (Fla. 1999); State v. Creamer, 996 P.2d 339, 343 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2000); Reidweg v. State, 981 S.W.2d 399, 406–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1998); Allen v. State, 43 P.3d 551, 569 (Wyo. 2002). 
 254. See Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1512, 1516 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) 
(“[T]he key to seeing strict liability as less deviant in the criminal justice system 
is . . . to see the real policy fight as a rather balanced one over the relative merits 
and demerits of precise rules (conclusive presumptions) and vague, ad hoc 
standards (case-by-case determinations of negligence).”); Richard A. 
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 744 
(1960) (characterizing antecedent legislative judgments underlying statutes like 
these as “similar to a jury determination that conduct in a particular case was 
unreasonable”). 
 255. The best indication that drunk-driving homicide statutes punish the 
defendant on the basis of the circumstances known to him when he acted, rather 
than on the basis of how things turned out, is that drunk-driving is a crime even 
when it doesn’t cause someone’s death. 
 256. See United States v. Wilson, 66 M.J. 39, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2008); Maxwell v. 
State, 895 A.2d 327, 336 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); State v. Holmes, 920 A.2d 
632, 635 (N.H. 2007); State v. Browning, 629 S.E.2d 299, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); 
State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 819 (Wis. 2004). For a helpful summary of 
the current law in all fifty states, see Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, 
Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 385–
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the basis of how things turned out are strongly disfavored, at 
least where the element in relation to which the statute 
imputes culpability is one that distinguishes criminal from 
innocent conduct. This disfavor is reflected in how courts 
interpret statutes. It is reflected in cases like Rehaif v. 
United States, for example, where the Supreme Court held 
that the statute defining the offense of being an 
undocumented immigrant in possession of a firearm actually 
required the government to prove that the defendant “knew 
he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from 
possessing a firearm.”257 It was not enough that the 
defendant turned out to be an undocumented immigrant. 
At least at first glance, my proposed limit on the heat-of-
passion defense would appear to run afoul of these general 
principles. After all, it imputes fault to the defendant for his 
decision to carry a firearm, and this imputation of fault is 
based in part on how things turned out later—on the fact 
that the defendant eventually wound up using the firearm to 
kill someone in the heat of passion. On closer examination, 
though, the matter is less clear. Specifically, it’s not clear 
whether the general principles reflected in cases like Rehaif 
actually bear on cases where the locus of fault is temporally 
removed from the act that triggers liability. 
To explain: In the ordinary type of crime, the culpable 
mental state required of the defendant is one that coincides 
temporally with his performance of the voluntary act that 
triggers liability. When a defendant is prosecuted for 
reckless homicide, for example, what matters is whether he 
was reckless in the instant when he performed the voluntary 
act that eventually caused the victim’s death.258 The same is 
true of non-result-based offenses like being a convicted felon 
 
91 (2003). 
 257. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). 
 258. See MOORE, supra note 37, at 36 (explaining that the fact finder must, in 
the usual case, identify a single “point in time where the act and mens rea 
requirements are simultaneously satisfied, and from which the requisite causal 
relations exist to some legally prohibited state of affairs”). 
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in possession of a firearm. In these cases, too, the required 
culpable mental states—knowledge of the prior felony 
conviction, for example, and knowledge that one is in 
possession of a firearm—must coincide temporally with the 
required conduct. In the ordinary sort of crime, then, “the act 
concur[s] with the mental fault.”259 This structural feature of 
ordinary crimes is reflected in the concurrence requirement: 
“With those crimes that require mental fault,” as Professor 
LaFave has said, “it is a basic premise of Anglo-American 
criminal law that the physical conduct and the state of mind 
must concur.”260 
Not all crimes share this structural feature, though, as 
we’ve learned. In some criminal cases—specifically, in some 
cases where the defendant himself contributes to the 
difficulties that justify, excuse, or partly excuse his 
subsequent criminal conduct—the real locus of fault is 
temporally removed from the act that triggers liability.261 
When a defendant is denied the benefit of the duress defense 
on the ground that his fear was attributable to his 
exceptional timidity, for example, the real locus of fault is not 
“the moment of the climactic choice” but, rather, the much 
earlier moment or moments when the defendant “fashion[ed] 
[his] values and . . . character.”262 In cases like these, the law 
doesn’t impose liability directly for the decisions by which the 
defendant fashioned his values and character. Rather, the 
 
 259. LAFAVE, supra note 107, § 6.3. 
 260. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1872) (“In every crime or public 
offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal 
negligence.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-114 (West 1972) (“In every crime or public 
offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal 
negligence.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.190 (West 1911) (“In every crime or 
public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or 
criminal negligence.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (West 1995) (“Except for 
deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b) or an offense that involves 
absolute liability, a person is not guilty of an offense unless, with respect to each 
element described by the statute defining the offense, a person acts while having 
one of the mental states of knowingly, negligently, or purposely.”). 
 261. See supra text accompanying notes 97–126. 
 262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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law forestalls intervention until the purely self-mediated 
risk inherent in these earlier decisions comes to fruition in a 
violation by the defendant of the criminal law’s external 
rules.263 As a result, the real locus of fault—the substitute or 
supplemental locus of blame, as I’ve called it—winds up 
being temporally dislocated from the act that triggers 
liability. 
Cases where courts express disfavor toward imputed 
fault generally are cases where the defendant’s fault, 
imputed or proved, concurs with the act that triggers 
liability. Is imputed fault held in the same disfavor in cases 
where the defendant’s fault is temporally removed from the 
act that triggers liability, as criminal law theorists 
sometimes suppose?264 It doesn’t appear to be. 
Consider the Model Penal Code. The drafters of the 
Model Penal Code didn’t take a backseat to anyone in their 
active dislike for imputed fault. This dislike is reflected, for 
example, in the Code’s rejection of the felony-murder 
doctrine, which imputes fault to the defendant for homicide 
on the basis of his participation in the underlying predicate 
felony.265 The drafters’ dislike for imputed fault also is 
reflected in the way they formulated the mens rea principle. 
Unlike the traditional common law version of the principle, 
which presumes only that the legislature meant to require 
proof of culpability with respect to those offense elements 
that differentiate criminal from innocent conduct,266 the 
 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 97–126. 
 264. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Addiction, Responsibility, and Neuroscience, 
2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 414–16 (2020) (arguing that the “tracing strategy,” 
which imposes liability for conduct at T2 on the basis of the defendant’s 
culpability in an earlier moment T1, doesn’t work unless the government proves 
the defendant’s culpability in the earlier moment on the same terms as would be 
required if the prosecution were based on his culpability at the later moment). 
 265. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 266. See, e.g., Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (“[W]e start 
from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress 
intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding ‘each 
of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.’” (citation 
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Code’s version requires the government to prove culpable 
mental states with respect to all material elements, 
including elements that merely differentiate more from less 
serious versions of the same offense.267 
Despite the disfavor in which they apparently held 
imputed fault, the drafters relied almost exclusively on 
imputed fault in settings where the locus of the defendant’s 
fault was temporally removed from the act that triggered 
liability.268 The drafters acknowledged that when a 
defendant is denied the benefit of the duress defense on the 
ground that his fear was attributable to exceptional timidity, 
he really is being blamed for how he “fashion[ed] [his] values 
and . . . character.”269 They did not, however, require the 
government to prove that the defendant, when he made the 
choices by which he fashioned his character and values, was 
 
omitted)). 
 267. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985); see also id. § 223.1 cmt. 
1 (explaining the rationale for applying this more-demanding variant of the mens 
rea principle in connection with the crime of aggravated theft: “The amount 
involved in a theft has criminological significance only if it corresponds with what 
the thief expected or hoped to get. To punish on the basis of actual harm rather 
than on the basis of foreseen or desired harm is to measure the extent of 
criminality by fortuity.”). 
 268. There are exceptions. For example, id. § 3.02(2) provides that an actor 
who causes the conditions requiring “a choice of harms of evils” won’t forfeit the 
choice-of-harms defense unless he actually was reckless or negligent in bringing 
about those conditions, and id. § 3.09(2) provides that a defendant who 
mistakenly believes that his conduct is justified in self-defense will forfeit the 
defense only if he was reckless or negligent in forming the mistaken belief. Unlike 
lots of other Code sections, these sections have proven unpopular with state 
legislatures, and with good reason. For one thing, it’s not clear as to what, exactly, 
the defendant must be reckless or negligent. The logical answer would appear to 
be the offense element or elements as to which the offense requires recklessness 
or negligence. But the section doesn’t say that. Nor do the pattern jury 
instructions. See HAW. CRIM. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.12 (HAW. SUP. CT. 
2021) (requiring the jury simply to decide whether the “actor was reckless or 
negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms”); PA. 
SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.314 (PA. BAR INST. 2016) 
(requiring jury to decide whether “in bringing about the situation requiring a 
choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his or her conduct, the 
defendant was not reckless or criminally negligent”). 
 269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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aware of the risk that his character and values ultimately 
would cause harm to others. The Code’s drafters 
acknowledged, too, that when a defendant is denied the 
benefit of the extreme emotional disturbance defense on the 
ground that his “explanation or excuse” for the disturbance 
is objectively unreasonable, he really is being blamed for his 
“character.”270 But they didn’t require the government to 
prove that the defendant, when he made the choices by which 
he cultivated a particular character trait, was aware that 
this character trait would make him more dangerous to 
others. Finally, with respect to voluntary intoxication, the 
Code’s drafters acknowledged that the voluntarily 
intoxicated defendant’s culpability inheres partly in the 
moment “when he imbibes.”271 But they didn’t require the 
government to prove that the defendant, when he imbibed, 
was aware that his intoxication might later cause him to 
commit an offense. Rather, they were content to impute fault 
to the defendant on the basis of (1) his voluntary 
consumption of an intoxicant and (2) how things turned 
out.272 
No movement is underway among courts or legislatures 
to purge the law of these sorts of imputed fault elements. On 
the contrary, the trend appears to be in the other direction. 
Granted, in the 1970s and 1980s a number of courts and 
legislatures tried to eliminate the imputed fault element 
from the criminal law’s treatment of intoxication.273 The 
 
 270. See State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 829 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)). 
 271. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“Becoming so 
drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor’s powers of perception is conduct that 
plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance the potential danger. 
The actor’s moral culpability lies in engaging in such conduct.”). 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 109–11. 
 273. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230(1) (1976) (making evidence of 
intoxication admissible and relevant to negate any statutory mental state, not 
just “specific intent”); Commonwealth v. Graves, 334 A.2d 661, 663 (Pa. 1975) 
(holding that evidence of intoxication is admissible and relevant to negate any 
statutory mental state, not just “specific intent”). See generally Mitchell Keiter, 
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Hawaii Legislature, for example, did away entirely with 
traditional limits on the admissibility of intoxication 
evidence in 1976, making the defendant’s intoxication 
admissible whenever it was relevant “to prove or negative . . . 
the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the 
offense.”274 The effect of this provision was, of course, to do 
away with imputed fault: if, in the moment he committed the 
crime, the defendant lacked the statutory mental state as a 
result of his intoxication, the government would actually 
have to prove, to convict him, that he had the required 
mental state in the moment when he imbibed.275 In Hawaii 
and elsewhere, not surprisingly, these changes eventually 
triggered a decisive countertrend.276 In 1986, the Hawaii 
Legislature adopted a new statute that entirely “prohibits 
the jury from considering self-induced intoxication to negate 
the defendant’s state of mind.”277 Other state legislatures 
have adopted similar measures.278 
 
Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 482, 482 (1997) (discussing expansion of intoxication defense and 
the resulting countertrend). 
 274. State v. Freitas, 608 P.2d 408, 410 (Haw. 1980) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 702-230(1) (1976)). 
 275. The legislative commentary to the Hawaii Penal Code says of this section: 
“If, as the Model Penal Code’s commentary states, ‘awareness of the potential 
consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the 
risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in our culture,’ then it 
hardly seems necessary to postulate a special rule of equivalence between 
intoxication and recklessness, or, as has been suggested, create a presumption of 
recklessness. All that is wisely required is to insure that evidence of intoxication 
will be admissible to either prove or rebut recklessness. This the Code does.” HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-230 cmt. (West 2015). 
 276. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 629 (8th ed. 2019) (commenting in relation to voluntary intoxication 
that “[a] strong countertrend is underway”). 
 277. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-230 (West 1986). The Hawaii Supreme Court 
later rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute, which is summarized as 
designed “to prevent defendants who willingly become intoxicated and then 
commit crimes from using self-induced intoxication as a defense.” State v. Souza, 
813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991). 
 278. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (upholding Montana 
statute that “disallow[ed] consideration of voluntary intoxication when a 
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Why, if imputed fault is so strongly disfavored in the 
ordinary run of criminal cases, is imputed fault the norm in 
cases where the fault element is temporally dislocated from 
the act that triggers liability? The answer might have 
something to do with control. In the class of cases we are 
discussing, the risk that makes the defendant’s earlier choice 
wrongful is self-mediated risk, which can only come to 
fruition via a later voluntary act by the defendant. These 
cases differ from ordinary criminal cases, then, in that the 
defendant, after making the choice that provides the locus of 
moral blame, actually has control over whether the risk 
comes to fruition. This isn’t to say, of course, that moral 
blame attaches to the exercise of volition by which the risk 
comes to fruition. The law doesn’t really have any business 
demanding of, say, the extremely timid actor that he 
transcend his fear in the moment of the criminal act. Still, if 
his choice in the later moment isn’t the locus of moral blame, 
it nevertheless is an indispensable condition of legal blame. 
And he controls it, if only barely.279 So his legal duty, if not 
his moral duty, is disjunctive: He either can fashion his 
character aright or he can refuse later to act on his character-
generated fear. The availability of this second, later 
opportunity to exercise control over his liability might 
explain, in part, why the law is not averse to imputing blame 
in relation to the earlier opportunity. 
The better explanation, though, is that imputing fault in 
settings like these is indispensable to the functioning of the 
criminal law as a system defined by “a mutuality of benefit 
and burden.”280 In settings where the locus of blame is 
temporally removed from the act that triggers liability, the 
risks that make the defendant’s conduct wrongful generally 
will be self-mediated risks. Unlike other risks, self-mediated 
risks depend mostly on the probabilities associated with the 
 
defendant’s state of mind is at issue”). 
 279. See Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe 
that proof of duress negates the voluntary act requirement.”). 
 280. Morris, supra note 52, at 477. 
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individual’s own future conduct. They might depend, for 
example, on the probability that the individual’s decision to 
cultivate racist beliefs eventually—perhaps years later—will 
cause him to perceive threats of violence where they don’t 
exist. Or they might depend on the probability that the 
individual’s decision to become intoxicated eventually will 
cause him to commit a serious crime. Probabilities like these 
depend on facts uniquely within the defendant’s 
knowledge.281 Neither the government nor the jury usually 
will be in a position to reconstruct what the defendant knew 
in the earlier moment about his vulnerability to the effects 
of intoxication, say, or about his vulnerability to anger. 
In settings where the defendant’s fault hinges on self-
mediated risk, then, imputed fault cannot really be 
denounced (as imputed fault usually is by scholars) as a 
“pragmatic, unprincipled device[] to make it easier for 
prosecutors to obtain convictions.”282 The alternative to 
imputing fault in these settings wouldn’t be for prosecutors 
to work harder. The alternative would be to relieve 
individuals of accountability for choices that pose real, if self-
mediated, risks to others—choices by which the individuals 
create the very difficulties they later invoke to justify, 
excuse, or partly excuse their later conduct. The alternative, 
in other words, would be to accept a criminal law that 
demands less of some individuals than others.283 Worse even 
than the reality of this inequality, though, would be the 
message of inequality conveyed by conferring impunity on 
defendants like Drejka. When the criminal law works 
correctly, “it tells members of an audience who may identify 
 
 281. Naturally, the criminal law calculates self-mediated risk as it calculates 
other risks: according to “the circumstances known to [the defendant]” in the 
moment of the ostensibly culpable choice. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 75; MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
 282. R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 261 (2009). 
 283. Cf. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 49–50 (explaining that the Montana statute 
disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication “comports with and 
implements society’s moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his 
own faculties should be responsible for the consequences”). 
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themselves as belonging to very different communities (in 
terms of wealth, race, etc.) that each is a citizen of the same 
society, subject to the same duties and punishments.”284 
Drejka’s conviction for manslaughter rather than murder 
sends the opposite message. It tells the community that 
people like Drejka are free to shift the risk of their 
noncompliance with the criminal law to others—others like 
Markeis McGlockton and his three children.285 
CONCLUSION 
On the surface, the criminal law doesn’t appear to 
accommodate rules like the one I’ve proposed. First of all, the 
kind of risk created by carrying a gun outside the home—
self-mediated risk, in other words—appears not to make 
conduct wrongful in the way criminal law usually requires. 
Second, criminal law appears to treat some individual 
choices—choices about what to believe, for example, and 
about whether to carry a gun—as so deeply personal that 
they not only cannot supply a freestanding basis for criminal 
liability but, in addition, cannot supply a basis for assigning 
blame, either. Third, the criminal law appears to disfavor 
imputing fault to the defendant on the basis of how things 
turned out. It would appear to disfavor, for example, 
imputing fault to the “mistaken racist” merely on the basis 
of the fact that his racist beliefs wound up causing another 
person’s death. And it would appear to disfavor imputing 
fault to a person who decides to carry a loaded gun outside 
the home merely on the basis of the fact that he eventually 
used the gun to kill someone in anger. 
As we’ve seen, though, these surface features of the 
criminal law are deceptive. The reason why the criminal law 
 
 284. Coffee, supra note 95, at 224. 
 285. Cf. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 953 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., 
dissenting) (“Allowing public carry of ready-to-use guns means that [the risk 
posed by firearms] is borne by all in Illinois, including the vast majority of its 
citizens who choose not to have guns.”). 
2021] WHEN PROVOCATION IS NO EXCUSE 1019 
doesn’t punish the creation of self-mediated risk directly—
why it doesn’t treat the creation of self-mediated risk as a 
freestanding basis for liability—is not that the creation of 
self-mediated risk isn’t wrong. The reason, rather, is that the 
government’s interest in punishing this wrong usually is 
outweighed by the individual’s liberty interest; it usually is 
outweighed by the individual’s interest in deciding for 
himself exactly how to go about complying with the criminal 
law’s external rules. Once the individual performs an act 
that represents the coming-to-fruition of the self-mediated 
risk, however, the balance changes. For the sake of treating 
everyone alike—for the sake, that is, of preserving criminal 
law’s fundamental “mutuality of benefit and burden”286—the 
law really has to take account, sometimes, of how the 
individual found himself in the circumstances that caused 
him to violate the law’s external rules. And since, as we’ve 
seen, the government couldn’t really be expected to prove 
that the defendant was at fault in the earlier moment—was 
at fault in creating the self-mediated risk—the law imputes 
fault instead. 
The proposed rule isn’t just consistent with the deep 
structure of the criminal law, though. It’s also urgently 
needed. In the old days, before District of Columbia v. 
Heller,287 state and local governments were permitted to, and 
frequently did, address the self-mediated risks associated 
with public carry directly, by adopting statutes or ordinances 
that either prohibited outright the carrying of loaded guns in 
public or else strictly regulated it.288 Statutes and ordinances 
like these communicated unambiguously the gravity, and 
 
 286. Morris, supra note 52, at 477. 
 287. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 288. See Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down, as 
violative of the Second Amendment, a District of Columbia statute that 
“confine[d] carrying a handgun in public to those with a special need for self-
defense”); Moore, 702 F.3d at 742 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down, as violative of 
the Second Amendment, Illinois’s blanket prohibition on public carry); Moeller, 
supra note 28, at 1407–09 (describing history of concealed carry laws in the 
United States). 
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riskiness, of the decision to carry a loaded firearm in public. 
Most current laws don’t, as Drejka’s attorney complained at 
Drejka’s sentencing.289 “I think you can even go online now 
and get a concealed weapons permit. It’s absurd,” he 
argued.290 As arguments for mitigation go, this isn’t a very 
good one. But it gets one thing right. The law has to do a 
better job of communicating to gun owners that the 
responsibility for evaluating the risks associated with 
carrying in public, including the risk that they’ll use the gun 
in anger, now belongs to them, not to the government. 
Holding gun owners accountable when they get this decision 
wrong—by denying them the benefit of the heat-of-passion 
defense—is a step in the right direction. 
 
 289. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 16, State v. Drejka, No. 18-09851-CF 
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